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The Medieval Origins of the Financial Revolution:
Usury, Rentes, and Negotiability
E  H observed many years ago that a ‘national debt isone of the very few important economic phenomena withoutroots in the Ancient World’.1 The first evidence for organized
public debts is to be found in towns of twelfth-century Italy. But these
interest-bearing loans bore little relation to what became known as the
financial revolution in public debt, which, in its seventeenth-century
Dutch and ultimate eighteenth-century British versions, had six funda-
mental components. First, the national debt was ‘permanent’, in that it
consisted largely of perpetual annuities or rentes, which, however, were
redeemable any time, at the will of the issuing government authority,
in contrast to interest-bearing loans with stipulated redemption dates.
Second, the debt obligation was national, or at least provincial, and
not merely municipal or personal, that is, the personal obligation of the
prince, even as head of state; instead, it was created by the state
through representative parliamentary institutions. Third, the annual
payments on such annuities and their periodic redemptions were
authorized by that parliament or legislative assembly, which thus
undertook to fund that debt by levying specific taxes, usually on con-
sumption. Fourth, the government’s creation or sale of these annuities
took place without any elements of state coercion, and in particular
without any arbitrary conversions of higher-interest short-term debts
into lower-yielding perpetual annuities. Fifth, the public had complete
confidence that the government would always meet its obligation to
make the stipulated annuity payments on the promised dates. Sixth,
those annuities were freely negotiable through financial intermediaries,
in secondary markets, for purchase by any buyer both inside and out-
side the national state.
According to Peter Dickson, the British financial revolution (a term
that he coined) began in , within England (before the Act of
An earlier version was delivered before the Economic History Association in October . I thank
Meir Kohn, Clyde Reed, Lawrin Amstrong, and James Tracy for helpful criticism, and the Social
Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for financial support.
1 E. J. Hamilton, ‘The Origin and Growth of the National Debt in Western Europe’, American
Economic Review, xxvii (May ), -.
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Union), during the reign of William III (r. -) and Mary II (r.
-). Forrest Capie, in referring to these events, remarks that ‘the
word revolution has perhaps been overused in economic historical stud-
ies, but perhaps this is an occasion when it is appropriate’; similarly,
Marjolein ’t Hart remarks that ‘currently the financial revolution in
England is being regarded as one of the hallmarks of the Modern
State, with England as the model country.’1 James Tracy, in contrast,
contends that the origins of the financial revolution are to be found in
the sixteenth-century Habsburg Netherlands, with its full fruition in
seventeenth-century Holland. Hamilton, and before him, Paul Cawès,
had made virtually the same claim for sixteenth-century France.2
That national debts arose from the sale of annuities or rentes is their
most striking feature: for they were not loans. Thus, they differed
markedly from the forms of national public finance, notably bonds and
debentures, common in medieval Europe and again in twentieth-cen-
tury Europe and North America. To explain the anomaly, one must
understand first the late medieval origins of the rente itself, and second,
the origins and evolution of fully fledged negotiability for all instru-
ments of credit. The foundations of the financial revolution are to be
found in the responses of thirteenth-century municipalities and mer-
chants to the increasingly severe obstacles that Church and State
were placing in the way of borrowing and international financial
transactions.
* * * * *
The most obvious, important, and best-known obstacle was the
Church’s ban on usury: that is, the exaction of interest or of any speci-
fied return beyond the principal value of a loan. Many scholars mis-
takenly contend that the ban had no effect on medieval trade and
finance, for one or more of four reasons: it concerned only so-called
consumption loans; it applied only to excessive interest (rarely
defined), as in the modern definition of the term; canon law allowed
exceptions (extrinsic titles) that paid interest on commercial loans; and
the public ignored the ban when and because the European economy
became so commercialized during the High Middle Ages. In the words
of Charles Kindleberger, usury ‘belongs less to economic history than
to the history of ideas’.3 In fact, just when the commercial revolution
1 P. G. M. Dickson, The Financial Revolution in England: A Study in the Development of Public Credit,
- (London, ); F. Capie, ‘The Origins and Development of Stable Fiscal and Monetary
Institutions in England’, in Transferring Wealth and Power from the Old to the New World: Monetary and
Financial Institutions in the th through the th Centuries, ed. M. Bordo and R. Cortés-Conde (Cam-
bridge, ), p. ; M. ’t Hart, ‘“The Devil or the Dutch”: Holland’s Impact on the Financial
Revolution in England, -’, Parliaments, Estates, and Representatives, xi (June ), .
2 J. D. Tracy, A Financial Revolution in the Habsburg Netherlands: Renten and Renteniers in the County of
Holland, - (Berkeley, ); Hamilton, ‘Origin and Growth’, pp. -; P. Cawès, ‘Les com-
mencements du crédit public en France: les rentes sur l’Hôtel de Ville au XVIe siècle’, Revue
d’économie politique, ix (), -, -; x (), -.
3 C. Kindleberger, A Financial History of Western Europe (London, ), p. . For other viewpoints
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reached its apogee during the thirteenth century, not only was the
campaign against usury in western Europe vigorously renewed, but
most of the ecclesiastical tracts and fulminations against it also focused
primarily on commercial or investment loans.
Two newly established mendicant religious orders – the Franciscans
(Order of Friars Minor, founded in or just after ) and the Domin-
icans (Order of Friars Preacher, founded in ) – were chiefly
responsible for the campaign, which began in the early thirteenth cen-
tury. They were aided by the Fourth Lateran Council, which, in ,
made annual confession obligatory, thus facilitating a more direct and
more frequent contact between the mendicant preachers and the laity.
It also issued a diatribe against Jews for ‘treachery’ and ‘cruel oppres-
sion’ in extorting ‘oppressive and excessive interest’, while engaging (as
non-Christians were allowed to do) in licensed pawnbroking.1 By so
associating usury with Jewish moneylenders, the Council turned it into
a more heinous mortal sin in the eyes of a largely anti-Semitic public.2
The friars found more ammunition in the Decretales that Pope Gregory
IX issued in : after confirming the Third Lateran Council’s decree
of  that had excommunicated usurers and refused the unrepentant
burial in consecrated ground, the Decretales required princes ‘to expel
usurers from their territories and never to readmit them’.3 In addition,
the Franciscans and Dominicans contrived their own stories about the
ghastly fates awaiting usurers after death and, by their incessant in-
flammatory preaching, convinced most people that usurers were
‘linked with the worst evildoers, the worst occupations, the worst sins,
and the worst vices’.4 By doing so, they helped to persuade many secu-
lar rulers to enforce the ban on usury during the later Middle Ages.
Thus, loan contracts that in an earlier era openly admitted the pay-
ment of interest are rarely encountered from the thirteenth century.5
        
that also question the medieval economic significance of the usury doctrine, contending that its ap-
plication varied with economic conditions, see R. B. Ekelund, R. F. Hébert, and R. D. Tollison, ‘An
Economic Model of the Medieval Church: Usury as a Form of Rent Seeking’, Journal of Law,
Economics, and Organization, v (), -; E. L. Glaeser and J. Scheinkman, ‘Neither a Borrower
Nor a Lender Be: An Economic Analysis of Interest Restrictions and Usury Laws’, Journal of Law
and Economics, xli (), -.
1 See J. Gilchrist, The Church and Economic Activity in the Middle Ages (New York, ), pp. -
(translation of Fourth Lateran Constitution, no. ).
2 See J. Shatzmiller, Shylock Reconsidered: Jews, Moneylending, and Medieval Society (Berkeley, ).
3 See J. A. Brundage, ‘Usury’, in Dictionary of the Middle Ages, ed. J. R. Strayer et al. (New York,
-), xii. .
4 For the role of the mendicant preachers in conducting the anti-usury campaign, see in particular
J. W. Baldwin, Masters, Princes, and Merchants: The Social Views of Peter the Chanter and His Circle
(Princeton, ), i. -; ii. -; J. F. McGovern, ‘The Rise of New Economic Attitudes in
Canon and Civil Law,  -’, The Jurist, xxxii (), -; J. Le Goff, ‘The Usurer and
Purgatory’, in The Dawn of Modern Banking, ed. Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies,
UCLA (New Haven, ), pp. -; O. Langholm, Economics in the Medieval Schools: Wealth,
Exchange, Value, Money, and Usury According to the Paris Theological Tradition, - (Leiden,
), pp. , -.
5 For Genoese examples, see Medieval Trade in the Mediterranean World: Illustrative Documents Trans-
lated with Introductions and Notes, ed. R. Lopez and I. Raymond (New York, ), pp. -.
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The other weapon in the thirteenth-century Scholastic armoury was
the works of Aristotle, in particular his conceptions of natural law and
the inherent sterility of money. Aristotle states that:
The most hated sort [of money-making], and with the greatest reason, is
usury, which makes a gain out of money itself, and not from the natural use of
it. For money was intended to be used in exchange, but not to increase at
interest. And this term usury [sjoy], which means the birth of money from
money, is applied to the breeding of money because the offspring resembles
the parent. Whereof of all modes of making money this is the most unnatural.1
To be sure, the early Middle Ages had been familiar with Aristotle’s
ideas, which had reappeared in the fifth- or sixth-century palea Ejiciens,
itself incorporated between  and  into the earliest compilation
of canon law, the Concordia discordantium canonum, commonly known
as Gratian’s Decretum.2 But the first genuine and complete Aristotelian
treatise to be received in medieval western Europe was the Nicomach-
ean Ethics, which the bishop of Lincoln, Robert Grosseteste, translated
from the original Greek into Latin in -. William of Moerbeke,
who revised this edition, also translated Aristotle’s Politics into Latin
during the s. Both works had a profound influence on the writings
of St Thomas Aquinas (-), himself a Dominican, as did the
Aristotelian commentaries produced by his mentor and fellow Domin-
ican St Albert the Great, or Albertus Magnus (c.-).3
Odd Langholm has strongly reasserted the view that Aristotle’s
natural law concept of the sterility of money formed the core of Scho-
lastic usury doctrine. John Noonan has contended, however, that many
late medieval Scholastics did not fully accept this argument, even
though they readily employed it, because of its popular appeal, to but-
tress their revived campaign against usury. Even before Aristotle’s
views were widely disseminated, no ingenuity was needed to find simi-
lar powerful arguments, beyond those emphasizing issues of charity. As
early as the fourth century, St Ambrose of Milan (-) had stated:
‘if someone takes usury, he commits violent robbery (rapina), and he
shall not live,’ a stricture quoted (along with the palea Ejiciens) in the
Decretum.4 The assumption that usury is theft runs throughout Scho-
lastic literature, because if money transferred in a loan is deemed to be
sterile, unable ‘to bear fruit’, the exaction of more money for its use is
obviously iniquitous, a form of robbery, as Aquinas contends.5 A
closely related Scholastic argument states that, because usury was cal-
1 The Politics of Aristotle: Translated Into English, ed. B. Jowett (Oxford, ), i. : Politics, book I..
b.
2 O. Langholm, The Aristotelian Analysis of Usury (Bergen, ), pp. -.
3 See Noonan, Scholastic Analysis of Usury, pp. -, -; R. McInery, ‘Aquinas, St Thomas’, in Dic-
tionary of the Middle Ages, ed. Strayer et al., i. -.
4 Quoted in O. Langholm, The Legacy of Scholasticism in Economic Thought: Antecedents of Choice and
Power (Cambridge, ), p. .
5 See Noonan, Scholastic Analysis of Usury, pp. -, -.
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culated according to the duration of the loan, it constituted the sinful
theft of Time, which belongs to God alone.1 Some later Scholastics,
however, challenged this argument, on the grounds that licit rent con-
tracts also specified a return based on the passage of time.
Canon lawyers also provided an additional and even more powerful
reason for asserting that usury is ipso facto theft, in citing the Roman
law concept of the loan, as defined by the sixth-century Justinian
Code, specifically including one that enabled the borrower to invest
money in property or a licit enterprise. The term for a loan is mutuum,
literally ‘what had been mine becomes thine’. Thus, in making the
loan, the lender transfers the ownership of the principal sum (in money
or goods), including all attached property rights, to the borrower in
perpetuity and requires, in repayment, only the exactly equivalent sum.
Hence, it would be a violation of commutative justice – requiring an
equality of exchange between lender and borrower – to exact an add-
itional amount, and thus to rob the borrower of the fruits of his indus-
try in utilizing capital that had become his own property. For Noonan,
this Scholastic analysis of the mutuum is at the core of the late medi-
eval usury doctrine, and explains why, if usury is theft, it becomes a
mortal sin.2 In fact, the argument predated the Scholastics. As early as
, the Bolognese canon lawyer Paucapalea had correlated the Jus-
tinian Code’s entries on mutuum with Gratian’s entry on usura in the
Decretum. Langholm contends that, by , Huguccio, the more
renowned commentator of the Bolognese law school, had set forth
more explicitly the argument for the transfer of ownership rights in a
mutuum.3
Such concepts were developed, within the context of natural law, by
Aquinas’ most prominent predecessors: William of Auxerre (-
), Thomas of Chobham (c.-c.), Robert of Courçon (in
his Summa of ), St Bonaventure (-), and Albertus Magnus.
Furthermore, although John Duns Scotus (-) disagreed with
aspects of Aquinas’ analysis of the usury doctrine, he, too, based his
own critique of usury on the transfer of ownership rights in a mutuum,
as did later Scholastics such as Giles of Lessines (De usuris, ),
Alexander Lombard (Tractatus de usuris, ), John Gerson (De
contractibus, ), St Bernardino of Siena (De Contractibus, ; De
Evangelis Aeterno, c.-), and St Antonino of Florence (Con-
fessionale of , and Summa Theologiae of ).4
1 See, e.g., William of Auxerre (c.) cited in Langholm, Aristotelian Analysis of Usury, pp. -.
For Peter the Chanter’s (d. ) development of the argument, see Baldwin, Masters, Princes, and
Merchants, i. -; ii. -.
2 Noonan, Scholastic Analysis of Usury, pp. -, -, -.
3 Ibid., pp. -, -, -, noting that canon lawyers used only those parts of Roman law on the
mutuum that supported the usury ban, while ignoring other aspects; see also Langholm, Economics in
the Medieval Schools, p. .
4 See Langholm, Economics in the Medieval Schools, pp. -, -, -, -, -, -,
-; Langholm, Legacy of Scholasticism, pp. -; Langholm, Scholastic Analysis of Usury, pp. -
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Long before the publication of these later works, at the latest from
the era of Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae (-), both theologians and
jurists regarded interest on a loan as a sin not only against charity but
also against commutative justice and natural law, and thus a mortal
sin. It was even a mortal sin for the lender to hope for any payment in
excess of the principal. The campaign against usury culminated in
- with the council of Vienne’s decree of excommunication for all
‘magistrates, rulers, consuls, judges, lawyers, and similar officials’ who
‘draw up statutes’ permitting usury or ‘knowingly decide that usury
may be paid’. The council added that, ‘if anyone falls into the error of
believing and affirming that it is not a sin to practise usury, we decree
that he be punished as a heretic.’1 At this moment, Dante Alighieri
(-) was writing his Divine Comedy, in which he placed usurers,
‘the last class of sinners that are punished in the burning sands’, in the
lower depths, the Seventh Circle, of Hell.2
Such dire strictures applied only to a predetermined return on
money lent in a mutuum, and certainly did not apply to other, licit
forms of capital investment. The distinction between licit rents and
profits and mortally sinful usury was based upon ownership. Anyone
who owned or invested in land, or other forms of real estate or physical
property, and who leased the use of the property to others was entitled
to receive a rental income on what remained his own property, even
though the return was predetermined. Furthermore, anyone who in-
vested money in a standard partnership contract (societas) or a com-
menda contract, drawn up for a single seafaring venture, was entitled to
receive a share of the profits, or dividends, according to the amount of
his investment of equity capital; for he, too, retained ownership.3
To contemporaries unconvinced that retention of ownership sup-
plied the distinction between licit and sinful investments, Aquinas of-
fered a solution in his analysis of the transfer of fungible commodities
within a mutuum: those not distinguishable from others in its group by
a specific defining characteristic, such as sheaves of wheat, flagons of
wine, jars of olive oil, and coined money. Since, as Aquinas argued, the
borrower’s use of such commodities ipso facto meant their transfer,
consumption, and thus either their complete destruction or disappear-
ance (in monetary circulation), repayment had to be made with other,
but identical units: that is, the same quantity of wheat, wine, oil, or
        
; Noonan, Scholastic Analysis of Usury, pp. -; L. Armstrong, Usury and the Public Debt in Early
Renaissance Florence: Lorenzo Ridolfi on the Monte Comune (Toronto, ), pp. -, contending
that the only theologian to reject the ‘transfer of ownership’ argument was Gerard of Siena (d.
c.).
1 Gilchrist, Church and Economic Activity, p.  (translation of decree no. ).
2 Canto XVII of Inferno, in Dante Alighieri, The Divine Comedy, trans. Carlyle, Okey, Wicksteed, ed.
C. H. Grandagent (New York, ), p. .
3 See Medieval Trade in the Mediterranean World, ed. Lopez and Raymond, pp. -. If an investor
provided all the capital, but did not otherwise participate in the venture, his liability was limited to his
capital investment, which entitled him to receive  per cent of any profits.
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coins – or coins of exactly equivalent value.1 Conversely, a non-
fungible is a commodity with individual distinguishing characteristics
that is not consumed by its use: such as land, a house, barn, or
horse. Therefore, one may licitly earn a rental income from the use of
such property, while retaining ownership and subsequently regaining
possession.
Both canon law and Scholastic treatises, influenced by civil law
commentators on Roman law from the twelfth century, allowed several
seeming exceptions to the ban on usury by which a lender in a mutuum
may receive some payment beyond the principal. In fact, the excep-
tions were extrinsic titles carefully defined to accord with both com-
mutative justice and the usury doctrine: permitting the lender to re-
ceive compensation for damages that occurred after the loan contract
was issued. The first such title was poena detentori or mora: a penalty
imposed for late payment – after the specified date of maturity of the
loan – often assessed by the week. Nonetheless, a tacit agreement to
make late payment was usurious (in fraudem usurarum). The second
title was damnum emergens: a compensation for damages or loss that
the lender incurred after having made the loan: for example, from not
having the money accessible in an emergency – a fire or storm that
destroyed his barns or livestock. The third title, which long remained
the most contentious, was lucrum cessans: forgone potential gains from
an alternative, licit, investment in commerce or industry. That may be
viewed as the lender’s opportunity cost in the form of interesse – the
origin of the word interest, which twelfth-century Bolognese jurists
derived from the Latin intersum-esse to designate the licit difference
between the principal and repayment of the loan. The moment such a
claim to compensation was seen to be predetermined and fixed, how-
ever, it failed to meet the required conditions of loss under commu-
tative justice, thus making the return usurious. For these reasons,
Aquinas himself, and most medieval canon lawyers, popes, and other
Church authorities rejected lucrum cessans as a legitimate extrinsic title
justifying the exaction of a return beyond the principal.2
Another reason for rejecting lucrum cessans as a licit extrinsic title to
interesse was the fear that it appeared to contradict the Aristotelian con-
cept of the sterility of money, even though many Scholastic treatises
concerning profit and rent imply that money did play a direct role in
the economy, as invested capital. Nevertheless, the Scholastics were
virtually unanimous in insisting that, in the case of loans, the fruits
derived from investing the borrowed money were uniquely due to the
borrower’s industry and enterprise.3 One important treatise that did
1 Noonan, Scholastic Analysis of Usury, pp. -.
2 See ibid., p.  (for Cardinal Hostiensis’ use of interesse in this context of lucrum cessans c.); see
also pp. -, -,  -; Langholm, Economics in the Medieval Schools, pp. , -, .
3 See Noonan, Scholastic Analysis of Usury, pp. -, -; Langholm, Aristotelian Analysis of Usury,
pp. -, -.
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imply a full endorsement of lucrum cessans and also implied that
money, when so invested, could be ‘fruitful’ in itself, written by the
theologian Peter John Olivi (-), was placed on the papacy’s
banned list (though apparently for other reasons). Nonetheless, the
treatise may have influenced both St Bernardino () and St
Antonino (), who recognized lucrum cessans, but only for mer-
chants who charitably made loans ex pietate. Its use was ‘never to be
counselled’ nor allowed to merchants who preferred to seek gains from
‘a usurious loan [rather] than in commerce’.1 According to Langholm,
the Church recognized the exemption only in .2
There were, of course, illicit ways by which to circumvent the ban
on usury, but not without increasing transaction costs in both the
private and state spheres of finance. One device was to cloak the loan
in a sales contract that specified future payment; but that might be
deemed usurious if the goods were actually sold on credit. If, however,
the stipulated future price was deemed to be a ‘just price’ and if a
lower current cash price was ‘a discount gratuitously given by the
seller’, the sales contract would probably have been accepted as licit by
the doctrine of venditio sub dubio, that is, with uncertainty.3 The most
common device was to disguise the amount of the loan by augmenting
the stipulated principal to be repaid by the amount of the required
interest payment.4 Apart from the risk of prosecution, and of social
stigma, the participants would know that they were committing both
usury and fraud, giving a defaulting debtor the opportunity to claim
that he had been the victim of extortion.
As Noonan remarks, even if the Church normally inflicted excom-
munication and other severe punishments only on ‘open’, ‘flagrant’, or
‘notorious’ usurers, ‘all hidden usury was still a mortal sin, and the
ultimate punishment of [eternal] damnation still awaited all hidden
usurers.’ Thus, ‘the real force of the usury law lay in its hold on men’s
souls, and there no evasion was possible.’ At a time when the Church
held such sway, ‘who will say that there is no meaning to the salvation
or damnation of a man?’5 Both the Dominican Domenico Pantaleoni
(c.-) and the Franciscan St Bernardino (c.-) had no
1 Quotations from J. Kirshner, ‘Reading Bernardino’s Sermon on the Public Debt’, in Atti del simposio
internazionale cateriniano-bernardiniano, Siena, - April , ed. D. Maffei and P. Nardi (Siena,
), pp. -. For Olivi’s treatise and its influence, see J. Kirshner and K. Lo Prete, ‘Peter John
Olivi’s Treatises on Contracts of Sale, Usury, and Restitution: Minorite Economics or Minor
Works?’, Quaderni fiorentini per la storia del pensiero giuridico moderno, xiii (), -; see also, R.
de Roover, San Bernardino of Siena and San’Antonino of Florence: Two Great Economic Thinkers of the
Middle Ages (Boston, ), pp. -.
2 Langholm, Aristotelian Analysis of Usury, pp. -, -; Langholm, Legacy of Scholasticism, p. .
3 See Noonan, Scholastic Analysis of Usury, pp. -; de Roover, San Bernardino, pp. -, notes that
most fifteenth-century theologians remained suspicious of emptio-venditio contracts with prices higher
for future goods than for current goods, as contracts in fraudem usurarum.
4 See, e.g., C. Wyffels, ‘L’usure en Flandre au XIIIe siècle’, Revue belge de philologie et d’histoire/
Belgisch tijdschrift voor filologie en geschiedenis, lxix (), , -, noting that such cloaking was
virtually impossible with demand loans (à manaie).
5 Noonan, Scholastic Analysis of Usury, pp. -; cf. LeGoff, ‘Usurer and Purgatory’, pp. -.
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doubt that anyone who escaped conviction in the ecclesiastical courts,
for lack of evidence, would nevertheless ‘be found guilty of usury in the
confessional and before God (quoad deum)’.1 As for non-Christians,
one must recall the prohibition of usury in both the Pentateuch and (as
riba) in the Koran.2
Even if such moral questions may not be susceptible of econometric
analysis, Francesco Galassi provides convincing statistical evidence
that, with the intensification of the anti-usury campaigns, Genoese
merchants and financiers sought to buy ‘fire insurance’ or ‘passports to
Heaven’ by making bigger donations to the Church, some of them as
restitution of illicit returns of usurious transactions.3 Richard Gold-
thwaite, in analysing the records of fifteenth-century Florentine banks,
comments on a telling peculiarity: ‘the lack of a cash account, which …
resulted from what was perhaps the strongest external constraint im-
posed on the banker, the usury doctrine’; similarly, Reinhold Mueller
notes that the records of fifteenth-century Venetian bank deposit
accounts do not mention interest, even though it was certainly paid.4
The risk of disclosure was not trivial. Goldthwaite cites the usury
charges brought against the Florentine banker Lorenzo di Buonaccorso
Pitti before the episcopal court in  and, a century earlier, the ad-
vice that the renowned Francesco Datini received, in , from an
associate concerning his intention to open a local bank in Florence:
that Datini ‘risked the ruin of his reputation as a merchant by entering
this business, since no banker could avoid usurious contracts’.5
This statement is echoed in Lawrence Stone’s comments on the
social costs of the ban on usury in Tudor-Stuart England, which was
supposedly less critical of interest payments:
Money will never become freely or cheaply available in a society which nour-
ishes a strong moral prejudice against the taking of any interest at all – as dis-
tinct from an objection to the taking of extortionate interest. If usury on any
terms, however reasonable, is thought to be a discreditable business, men will
tend to shun it, and the few who practise it will demand a high return for being
generally regarded as moral lepers.6
1 Cited in J. Kirshner, ‘Storm over the Monte Comune: Genesis of the Moral Controversy over the
Public Debt of Florence’, Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum, liii (), ; and in Kirshner, ‘Reading
Bernardino’s Sermon’, p. .
2 H. Soloveitchik, ‘Usury, Jewish Law’, and S. Ward, ‘Usury, Islamic Law’, both in Dictionary of the
Middle Ages, ed. Strayer et al., xii. -.
3 F. L. Galassi, ‘Buying a Passport to Heaven: Usury, Restitution, and the Merchants of Medieval
Genoa’, Religion, xxii (), -.
4 R. Goldthwaite, ‘Local Banking in Renaissance Florence’, Journal of European Economic History, xiv
(), -, -, noting also that interest paid on time deposits was always a discrezione; R.
Mueller, Money and Banking in Medieval and Renaissance Venice :  II: The Venetian Money Market,
Banks, Panics, and the Public Debt, - (Baltimore, ), p. . See also R. de Roover, The Rise
and Decline of the Medici Bank, - (Cambridge, MA, ), pp. -.
5 Goldthwaite, ‘Local Banking’, pp. -.
6 L. Stone, The Crisis of the Aristocracy, - (Oxford, ), p. .
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* * * * *
Despite the ban on usury, no medieval European government – muni-
cipal, territorial, or national – was able to function without borrowing,
given that its powers to tax and exact rents were limited, while it was
often engaged in costly wars.1 But such loans were usually for short
terms, often at punitive rates of interest. During the twelfth century,
the Italian progenitors of the ongoing Commercial Revolution de-
veloped what became a system of municipally funded debts, debts that
subsequently became permanent. Genoa took the lead, in , when
it agreed to give a consortium of the city’s lenders control over a
compera, a consolidated fund of tax revenues to be used in paying the
city’s creditors.2
Venice followed suit in , by securing a loan of , silver marci
against the tax revenues from the Rialto market for twelve years. In
, in return for a loan of , Venetian lire, to finance the doge’s
siege of Zara, creditors were given control over the salt tax and certain
house rents for thirteen years; thereafter, the Salt Office was made
responsible for all such loan payments.3 According to Mueller, by
, the Venetians had adopted what had already become the hall-
mark of public finance in the Italian republics: a system of forced
loans, known locally as prestiti, whose interest charges were financed by
additional taxes on salt, the Rialto market, and the weigh-house.4
Between  and , the Venetian Senate consolidated all of the
state’s outstanding debts into one fund later called the Monte Vecchio –
mountain of debt – and decreed that debt-holders should receive
annual interest at  per cent, which the Ufficiale degli Prestiti was
required to pay twice yearly from eight specified excise taxes. These
prestiti debt claims (with interest payments) were assignable through
the offices of the procurator of San Marco and, by  at the latest, a
secondary market for them had developed.5 So long as the interest was
paid regularly and some redemptions of principal were made, the
prestiti claims traded between par and  per cent. From , how-
ever, all redemptions ceased, except for occasional repurchases at pre-
vailing market values (for example, in ), so that these forced loans,
in effect, became perpetual liabilities. The interest was always paid on
1 See P. Jones, The Italian City-State: From Commune to Signoria (Oxford, ), pp. -.
2 See J.-C. Hocquet, ‘City-State and Market Economy’, in Economic Systems and State Finance, ed. R.
Bonney (Oxford, ), pp. -.
3 J.-C. Hocquet, ‘Venice’, in The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, c.-, ed. R. Bonney (Oxford,
), pp. -.
4 Mueller, Venetian Money Market, p. ; see also, Jones, Italian City State, p. , who states that
the first Italian evidence that he has found for a forced loan was at Pisa, in .
5 See a detailed analysis in Mueller, Venetian Money Market, pp. -; G. Luzzatto, Il debito
pubblico della Repubblica di Venezia, - (Milan, ); and also F. C. Lane, ‘The Funded Debt
of the Venetian Republic, -’, in Venice and History: The Collected Papers of Frederic C. Lane
(Baltimore, ), pp. -. Luzzatto, Lane, and Mueller agree that Venice lacked a permanently
funded public debt before -.
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schedule, until the war of Chioggia in -, when the Venetian state
imposed a new series of forced loans and then, after temporarily sus-
pending interest payments, subjected them to withholding taxes, re-
ducing the effective rate to  or even  per cent.1
Elsewhere, in Tuscany, Siena exacted forced loans from , while
continuing to solicit some voluntary loans.2 Florence soon followed
suit. Between  and , it, too, set up a consolidated fund (the
Monte Comune) for its public debt, composed largely of forced loans,
known as prestanze, on which the city paid an annual interest (paghe) of
 per cent.3 Similarly, in , Genoa consolidated all of its forced
loans, which had commenced in  and became known as luoghi,
into a consolidated fund called a compera, and in -, while under
French rule, consolidated all subsequent loans in the compere nuova
regiminis Sancti Georgi, a state bank better known as the Casa di San
Giorgio, which Jacques Heers calls ‘la plus puissante institution finan-
cière de l’Occident’.4 It lowered the interest rates on the luoghi from 
per cent to  per cent in , and finally to . per cent in .5
Lucca consolidated its public debt (Dovana Salis et Massa Creditorum)
derived from forced loans (proventus) only in , the year after it had
regained its independence from Pisa.6
While also soliciting voluntary short-term loans, the Italian city
states levied their prestiti, prestanze, or luoghi according to the citizen’s
ability to pay based on the value of his property and assets recorded in
the communal estimo or census registers. The interest payments,
financed by the salt tax and other indirect taxes (gabella), thereby
transferred income from the lower to the upper income strata. But not
all Italian cities resorted to forced loans: many of those ruled by signori
(for example, Milan) relied instead on a floating debt of voluntary
short-term loans. As Mueller has contended, most of the Italian city
states that resorted to forced loans and consolidated their long-term
debts had strong republican traditions.7
For such states, forced loans had three major advantages. First, they
demonstrated that every citizen had the duty to provide the state with
an equitable share of financial support – sub necessitate et pro utilitate
publica – if only to help to ensure its security and territorial integrity.
1 See Hocquet, ‘Venice’, pp. -; Hocquet, ‘City State’, pp. -.
2 W. Bowsky, The Finances of the Commune of Siena, - (Oxford, ), pp. -, app. , pp.
-.
3 B. Barbadoro, Le finanze della Repubblica fiorentina: Imposta diretta e debito pubblico fino all’istituzione
del Monte (Florence, ), pp. -; A. Molho, Florentine Public Finances in the Early Renaissance,
- (Cambridge, MA, ), pp. -.
4 J. Heers, Gênes au XVe siècle: activitié économique et problèmes sociaux (Paris, ), p. .
5 Ibid., pp. -; and the classic study by H. Sieveking, Genueser Finanzwesen mit besonderer Berück-
sichtigung der Casa Di S. Georgio (Freiburg, -). In , the rate was ostensibly reduced to .
per cent; but with an additional payment of one florin, the real rate remained at . per cent.
6 C. Meek, Lucca, -: Politics and Society in an Early Renaissance City State (New York, ),
pp. -.
7 Mueller, Venetian Money Market, pp. -.
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Second, citizens preferred forced loans to the alternative, direct tax-
ation, because subscribers received both interest income and a market-
able asset. After Florence abolished its estimo land tax in , Siena
was the only important Italian commune to combine forced loans
(preste) with direct taxes (dazi ) – though it permitted one to be de-
ducted against the other – until Venice introduced its decima tax in
 at the outbreak of its war with the Ottomans.1 Third, because vir-
tually everybody agreed that forced loans were a necessary obligation
imposed on all citizens, in defending their state, and because volition
was at the very core of the usury doctrine, many theologians and jurists
justified the payment and receipt of interest with some version of
damnum emergens or interesse.2
When free secondary markets in the various monti or compera de-
veloped during the early to mid-fourteenth century, such justifications
became much more difficult to devise. Indeed, many theologians now
questioned the justification for interest payments received by those
who had voluntarily agreed to buy monte shares, with contracts that,
furthermore, usually permitted them to receive a higher rate than that
paid to the original owners: that is, more than the nominal  per cent
paghe, which had become the standard rate in Venice, Florence, and
(eventually) Genoa. The reason why the buyer gained a higher rate is
simply the fact that those who sought to sell their monte shares in these
markets usually had to sell at discount, accepting values well below
par, in order to attract a buyer; and thus the buyer who purchased a
monte share with a nominal value of  lire (and a paghe of  lire per
year) for only  lire would earn  per cent per year.
This situation led to a lengthy debate in fourteenth- and fifteenth-
century Italy among theologians and jurists. The debate began in ,
shortly after Florence had consolidated its debt, when the Franciscan
master Francesco da Empoli (d. ) issued his treatise Determinatio
de materia montis. He contended that buyers of shares in the monte
bearing annual interest payments did not become lenders to the state;
and they were not guilty of any usurious conduct, because such crediti
di monte were no longer based on the original mutuum (loan). Instead,
these crediti were now the object of an emptio-venditio (purchase-sale)
contract in which the holder purchased the right (ius) to collect a
stream of future income from the state, an argument with considerable
significance for the evolution of rentes. In a strongly worded response,
1 The Florentine government, during war emergencies, temporarily and abortively restored the estimo
in , -, , , and . See Barbadoro, Finanze della repubblica fiorentina, pp. -;
Molho, Florentine Public Finances, pp. -;  Bowsky, Siena, pp. -, -.
2 Kirshner, ‘Bernardino’s Sermon’, pp. -, -; L. Armstrong, ‘The Politics of Usury in
Trecento Florence: The Questio de Monte of Francesco da Empoli’, Mediaeval Studies, lxi (), -
and Usury and the Public Debt, pp. -. For one exception, Alexander of Lombard (c.-), see J.
Kirshner, ‘Conscience and Public Finance: A Quaestio Disputata of John of Legnano on the Public
Debt of Genoa’, in Philosophy and Humanism: Renaissance Essays in Honor of Paul Oskar Kristeller, ed.
E. Mahoney (New York, ), pp. -.
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the Dominican theologian Piero degli Strozzi (-) contended
that anyone who purchased monte shares did become a creditor of the
commune, and in doing so harboured the sinful hope of profiting from
this loan. Furthermore, he contended, the commune’s annual pay-
ments on monte shares were actually a donum or gift given only to the
original holders, who were therefore not entitled to sell the ius to col-
lect such payments.1
Raymond de Roover, relying on Matteo Villani’s Cronica, contends
that the Franciscans ‘gave their blessings to state creditors’ who pur-
chased crediti di monte, while ‘the Hermits of St Augustine, soon joined
by the Dominicans, were representing them as parasites who were
sucking the lifeblood of the state’.2 Julius Kirshner and Lawrin Arm-
strong, on the other hand, both deny the existence of such a rigid
division and contend that most of da Empoli’s critics were theologians.
Most Dominicans and Franciscans condemned participation in the
secondary market in crediti di monte as ‘unnatural and nutritive of sin’,
in fraudem usurarum; and those few who merely expressed reservations
nevertheless advised everyone ‘to refrain from such investments’.3
Conversely, most of da Empoli’s supporters were jurists; and the most
famous was the Florentine patrician and lay canonist, Lorenzo Ridolfi,
who, in -, wrote the very influential Tractatus de usuris.4 Almost
all theologians and jurists, while conceding that the state had the right
to exact forced loans and pay an annual compensation, nevertheless
agreed that those who willingly subscribed to loans, forced or not, ‘out
of greed’ and in the hope of interest payments, should be treated as
‘plain usurers’. Similar debates took place in Genoa and Venice.5 The
legal treatises, however brilliant, failed to convince most theologians,
or to appease the consciences of many investors.
In discussing the debates in Genoa, Kirshner cites ‘well-documented
cases of investors who, because of scruples of conscience, were hesitant
about purchasing shares in the public debt’.6 Similarly, in an early fif-
teenth-century will, a wealthy Florentine merchant confesses that he is
1 See Armstrong, ‘Politics of Usury’, pp. - and Usury and the Public Debt, pp. -; Kirshner,
‘Storm over the Monte’, pp. -, -, -.
2 Quotations from de Roover, San Bernardino, pp. -. For de Roover’s apparent reliance on
Matteo Villani, Cronica, ed. F. Dragomanni (Florence, ), lib. III, cap. , , see Kirshner,
‘Storm over the Monte’, pp. -.
3 J. Kirshner, ‘The Moral Theology of Public Finance: A Study and Edition of Nicholas de Anglia’s
Quaestio disputata on the Public Debt of Venice’, Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum, xl (), -
and ‘“Ubi est ille?”: Franco Sacchetti on the monte comune of Florence’, Speculum: A Journal of
Medieval Studies, lix (), -; Armstrong, ‘Politics of Usury’, pp. - and Usury and Public
Debt, pp. -.
4 Kirshner, ‘Storm over the Monte’, pp. -; Armstrong, Usury and Public Debt, pp. -, -,
-.
5 For Venice, see Kirshner, ‘Moral Theology of Public Finance’, pp. -; F. C. Lane, ‘Investment
and Usury’, in Lane, Venice and History, pp. -; and Mueller, Venetian Money Market, pp. -.
For Genoa, see Kirshner, ‘Conscience and Public Finance’, pp. - and ‘The Moral Controversy
over Discounting Genoese Paghe, -’, Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum, xlvii (), -.
6 Kirshner, ‘Conscience and Public Finance’, p. . Cf. also Lane, ‘Investment and Usury’, p. :
usury’s ‘greatest importance was its moral influence’.
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‘uneasy in his conscience’ about the income earned from credits in the
Florentine monte, which accounted for  per cent of his assets, even
though they were solely ‘on account of prestanze’ that he and his
parents had been forced to pay. The will therefore stipulates that ‘if a
declaration or decision is made by the Roman church or a general
council’ determining that such income was illicit, his ‘heirs shall act in
every respect in conformity with the decree, decision, determination,
or conclusion of the Roman church’.1
* * * * *
In northern Europe, the resuscitation of the anti-usury campaign had
produced, by the early thirteenth century, even greater qualms about
receiving interest from public loans, all the more so because most loans
were then voluntary. That concern, even if shared by only a minority
of potential investors, may explain why a growing number of French
and Flemish cities, from the s, devised a less problematic alterna-
tive in the form of rente contracts.
Rente contracts were unknown in Roman law; and Raymond Van
Uytven’s contention that they were employed in the ancient Greek city
state of Miletus has dubious foundations.2 As an instrument of public
finance, the rente was based on the Carolingian census contract that
many monasteries had long utilized in order to acquire bequests of
lands, on condition that the donor receive an annual usufruct income
(redditus) from the land, in kind or money, for the rest of his life and
sometimes for the lives of his heirs.3 The income was deemed to be
part of the ‘fruits’ of the property (for example, the harvest): originally
it was paid in wheat, wine, olive oil, or similar commodities, and, from
the twelfth century, more commonly in money. For that reason, the
census or cens came to be known as a ‘rent’ or rente, from which we
derive the term rentier. The closest equivalent in modern English is the
annuity, although this term does not imply that the annual return was
necessarily based on a ‘fruitful good’, as stipulated in all medieval dis-
cussions of both rente and census contracts, in both canon and civil
law.4
1 L. Armstrong, ‘Usury, Conscience, and Public Debt: Angelo Corbinelli’s Testament of ’, paper
delivered to the Centre for Medieval Studies, University of Toronto, Jan. . Julius Kirschner,
having discovered the will in the Florentine archives, informed Armstrong about it.
2 R. Van Uytven, Stadsfinanciën en stadsekonmie te Leuven: van de XIIe tot het einde der XVIe eeuw
(Brussels, ), p. . In the updated version of his source, that contention is not repeated: in M.
Van Haaften, ‘Lijfrente’, in Grote Winkler Prins, xii (Amsterdam, ), -.
3 B. Kuske, Das Schuldenwesen der deutschen Städte im Mittelalter (Tübingen, ), pp. - (whose
earliest example is for the Carolingian Abbey of St Gallen, in Hergau, ‘um ’). See also A. P.
Usher, The Early History of Deposit Banking in Mediterranean Europe: I: The Structure and Functions of
the Early Credit System: Banking in Catalonia: - (Cambridge, MA, ; reissued New York,
), p. ; E. B. and M. M. Fryde, ‘Public Credit, with Special Reference to North-Western
Europe’, in The Cambridge Economic History of Europe: III: Economic Organization in the Middle Ages,
ed. M. Postan, E. E. Rich, and E. Miller (Cambridge, ), p.  and especially n. .
4 See Noonan, Scholastic Analysis of Usury, pp. - (quotation on p. ).
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According to Bernard Schnapper, the census evolved into two related
financial contracts. The older of the two, known as the bail à rente, pro-
vided for the sale of real estate or some form of fixed property in return
for a perpetual annual income. The other form, more relevant to the
history of public finance, evolved from the first into the constitution de
rente – also known as the rente à prix d’argent – a contract by which the
property holder (the débirentier) sold, for a specified sum, the right to
receive a fixed annual income from his property or other real assets
while retaining the ownership of the property. In almost all rente con-
tracts dating from the early thirteenth century, the issuer or débirentier
pledged all of his assets to meet the annual payment, on penalty of
forfeiture.1 Thus, well before the rente contract became a vehicle of
public finance in northern Europe, it had become a widespread form of
private investment in the agricultural economies of Mediterranean
western Europe, one by which a merchant or financier supplied needed
capital to a small landholder in return for a perpetual income.2
When the rente contract began to play a role in financing municipal-
ities, it took two forms: the traditional perpetual hereditary rent known
as rente héritable – erfelijk rent, erfrent, and later losrent in Flemish and
Dutch; and a newer form of life-rent, known as rente viagère or lijfrent,
that was extinguished on the death of the holder (crédirentier), though
some were issued for two or three designated lives, to be transferred at
death to a spouse, child, or close relative. The annual payments on
single-life rentes, if always lower than interest rates on voluntary short-
term loans, were always higher than, and sometimes twice as high as,
those on perpetual or hereditary rentes, perhaps because the latter,
being assignable, proved to be more marketable.3
In noting the crucial role of German, Flemish, and northern French
municipalities in developing the rente contract as a vehicle of public
finance during the thirteenth century, and its complete absence in
southern French towns, Matthew and Edmund Fryde state that ‘the
contrast in the forms of municipal borrowing between northern and
southern France cannot be satisfactorily explained.’4 James Tracy,
however, offers several explanations to resolve this paradox, chiefly
based on publications of Charles Petit-Dutaillis that analyse the differ-
ences in the legal status of northern and southern municipalities and
1 B. Schnapper, Les rentes au XVIe siècle: histoire d’un instrument de crédit (Paris, ), pp. -.
2 See D. Herlihy, Medieval and Renaissance Pistoia, - (New Haven, ), pp. -, and
table .
3 G. Bigwood, Le régime juridique et économique du commerce de l’argent dans la Belgique du moyen âge
(Brussels, -), i. -. Thus, in late thirteenth-century Flemish towns, the annuity rate on per-
petual rents (erfelijk renten) was  per cent, falling to . per cent (/) in the fifteenth century; the
rate on lijfrenten in the late thirteenth century was typically . per cent (/), falling to  or even 
per cent (/.) in the fifteenth century. See also Tracy, Financial Revolution, p.  n. ; and espe-
cially Fryde, ‘Public Credit’, pp. -, noting that rates on life-rents in medieval eastern Germany
were . to . per cent, but only  per cent in Cologne.
4 Fryde, ‘Public Credit’, pp.  (quotation), -, -.
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their relationships with the French Crown.1 Louis IX (r. -), who
granted the chartered communes of the central and northern langue
d’oeil region an augmented status as corporate legal entities, thereby
enhanced their magistrates’ authority to pledge both the revenues of
the towns and the property of all their citizens as surety for the new
rentes. In contrast, in the southern or languedoc regions under English
jurisdiction, towns were forcibly subjected, from about , to a
much stronger royal control, while most towns in the south-east, under
French jurisdiction, had never been incorporated as communes, and
thus continued to be supervised by magistrates called consuls, whose
office dated from the Roman era.2 Both of these developments, how-
ever, occurred after the s, when the earliest rentes were issued in
various northern towns.
Some evidence that the currently vigorous anti-usury campaign may
have played a role in their adoption of rentes can be found in Pierre
Desportes’ account of the response of the Rheims bourgeoisie, when
threatened in  with an ecclesiastical investigation of their ‘usures’:
subjected to a ‘véritable terreur’, they decided to purchase rentes
instead of making any further loans (‘prêts proprement dits’).3 In ,
Pope Innocent IV (r. -) relieved the monks of Saint-Rémi and
the commune of Beauvais of their obligation to pay interest owed to
their creditors.4 Similarly, David Nicholas, in discussing social atti-
tudes in medieval Flanders, northern France’s most important county,
remarks that ‘the Flemings seem to have been more concerned than
the Italians to avoid the imputation of usury.’5 Thus, he echoes
Georges Bigwood’s assertion that, in thirteenth-century Flanders and
Artois, ‘the struggle against usury was energetically and remorselessly
conducted’ by Church, towns (Douai from ), and princes.6 To be
sure, from , Guy de Dampierre (r. -) and the successor
counts of Flanders licensed Italian ‘Lombard’ merchants to maintain
regulated pawnbroking ‘tables’; but such pawnbroking could be inter-
preted as the discounted sale and repurchase of goods (venditio sub
dubio) rather than as usury. De Roover comments that, nevertheless,
‘the Lombards in Flanders as elsewhere lived in constant fear of a sud-
den reversion to repressive methods and under the permanent threat of
expulsion and spoliation.’7
1 J. Tracy, ‘On the Dual Origins of Long-Term Urban Debt in Medieval Europe’, conference on
Urban Public Debt and the Market for Annuities, th-th Centuries, Ghent, Nov. . I am in-
debted to Professor Tracy for sending me his valuable paper.
2 C. Petit-Dutaillis, The French Communes in the Middle Ages, trans. J. Vickers (Amsterdam, ), pp.
-, -, -.
3 Quoted in P. Desportes, Reims et les Rémois au XIIIe et XIVe siècles (Paris, ), pp. , .
4 Ibid., p. .
5 D. Nicholas, The Metamorphosis of a Medieval City: Ghent in the Age of the Arteveldes, -
(Lincoln, ), p.  (though referring in fact to fourteenth-century private transactions).
6 Bigwood, Régime juridique, i. -. Cf. Wyffels, ‘L’usure en Flandre’, pp. -.
7 R. de Roover, Money, Banking, and Credit in Mediaeval Bruges: Italian Merchant Bankers, Lombards,
and Money-Changers: A Study in the Origins of Banking (Cambridge, MA, ), pp. -; Wyffels,
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The continuous risk of debt repudiation for usurious lenders was
demonstrated during the financial crises that beset the Flemish towns
during the s.1 In November , the parlement of Paris issued a
decree cancelling Flemish communal debts deemed to be usurious ‘ou
soupetenneuse d’usure’, and punishing civic ‘administrateurs par
lesquelz la commune aura estre dommagé’ by such usuries.2 In Febru-
ary , Philip IV the Fair (r. -) ordered the bailiffs of Ghent
to take any steps necessary to protect victims of ‘usurious trans-
actions’.3 Shortly afterwards, in January , Pope Boniface VIII (r.
-), at Philip’s insistence, issued a decree to relieve Bruges
from the ‘vicious usurious obligations’ (per usurariam pravitatem de
solvendis) owed to Robert and Baldwin Crespin ‘beyond the principal
sums owed to them’.4 Guy de Dampierre, himself heavily indebted to
the Crespins, also appealed to the pope to release him from their
‘usurious loans’.5 In their survey of medieval public credit, Matthew
and Edmund Fryde state that ‘in no other country were lenders so
frequently despoiled and ruined’ as in France under Philip IV and his
immediate successors; and that, on numerous occasions, ‘Italian mer-
chants were seized by the king on the pretext that they were guilty of
usurious practices’ and were released ‘only after paying very substantial
fines’.6
Such a misuse of the usury ban, in extorting financial advantages for
princes and municipalities, might have backfired, in jeopardizing access
to additional sources of credit, were it not for the new, alternative, and
non-usurious form of finance that proved more attractive to risk-averse
and morally concerned creditors. While many, like the bourgeoisie of
Rheims, may have sought to invest solely in rentes, others may have
preferred to hold a balanced investment portfolio, containing both
long-term or perpetual rentes with low yields and the riskier, short-
term, higher-interest-bearing loans, with specific redemption dates.
It is not, however, sufficient to assert that the diffusion of rente con-
tracts was the consequence of the intensified anti-usury campaign of
the thirteenth century, at a time when so many towns were experien-
cing financial difficulties. The hypothesis depends upon satisfying two
other historical conditions: first, that municipal and then state govern-
ments benefited not only from a better supply of long-term funding
that proved attractive to investors, but also from one with lower ser-
vicing costs; and second, and more necessary, that no taint of usury
came to be attached to rente contracts.
When the theological discussion of census or rente contracts began, in
        
‘L’usure en Flandre’, pp. -; Bigwood, Régime juridique, i. -, -.
1 See D. Nicholas, Medieval Flanders (London, ), pp. -.
2 Bigwood, Régime juridique, ii. - (doc. no. ).
3 Ibid., ii. - (doc. no. ).
4 Ibid., i. -; ii.  (doc. no. ).
5 Ibid., ii. - (doc. no. ). See also Fryde, ‘Public Credit’, pp. -.
6 Fryde, ‘Public Credit’, pp. -.
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the early thirteenth century, just after the northern towns had resorted
to them, it did not augur well. In the first reference to such contracts,
in July , the archbishop of Rheims refused, ‘in the name of the
community’, to approve the Hôtel-Dieu’s sale of a rente viagère, because
he suspected that the contract was usurious.1 In -, Geoffrey of
Trani contended that anyone who bought a rente harboured an ‘im-
moral hope’ of receiving a sum of annual payments that exceeded his
original investment, and was therefore guilty of usury. Around ,
William of Rennes, in a gloss on the Summa of Raymond de Penyafort,
concluded that, although the rente viagère was not in itself (ex forma)
usurious, it was nonetheless immoral and illegitimate, for reasons simi-
lar to those cited by Geoffrey of Trani. He declared illicit any rente that
was not strictly tied to real estate.2
The following year (), however, Pope Innocent IV declared that
rentes were not usurious, and were legitimate contracts of sale, pro-
vided that the annual payments were based on ‘real’ properties.3 Fur-
thermore, in two treatises, one written around  and the other
twenty years later, around , Hostiensis (Henry Cardinal of Susa)
rejected all of Geoffrey of Trani’s arguments and endorsed Innocent
IV’s decree.4 In issuing his Quodlibets in , Henry of Ghent became
the last important theologian to reject the rente contract as usurious.
His arguments, echoing those of Geoffrey of Trani, that it involved
‘the sale of money, which is non-vendible’ and promoted immoral
hopes of gain, well in excess of the principal, immediately provoked
hostile reactions, even within his own University of Paris.5 Shortly
thereafter, in , Giles of Lessines justified the return on census con-
tracts on the grounds that ‘future things over a period are not esti-
mated to be of such value as things collected in an instant [in the
present].’6 By this date, almost every theologian regarded the census as
a contract of purchase and sale (emptio in forma) involving the licit pur-
chase of future streams of income or usufruct from property; and
others, such as the Dominican Roland of Cremona, argued that,
1 Desportes, Reims et les Rémois, pp. - and n. .
2 Geoffrey of Trani (Gottofredo da Trani), Summa super titulis Decretalium, X . de usuris, n. ;
and William of Rennes, gloss on Summa Sancti Raymundi de Peyniafort de Poenitentia et Matrimonio,
. de usuris: both analysed in F. Veraja, Le origini della controversia teologica sul contratto di censo nel 
secolo (Rome, ), pp. -; B. Schnapper, ‘Les rentes chez les théologiens et les canonistes du
XIIIe au XVIe siècles’, in Études d’histoire du droit canonique dédiées à Gabriel le Bras, ed. G. Vedel
(Paris, ), i. -.
3 Innocent IV, Commentaria super libris quinque Decretalium, ad X .. In civitate, n. : analysed in
Veraja, Origini della controversia, pp. -; and Schnapper, ‘Les rentes chez les théologiens’, pp. -
.
4 Hostiensis, In Decretalium libros commentaria, ad X .. In civitate, and Summa aurea, ad X . de
usuris: both analysed in Veraja, Origini della controversia, pp. -.
5 Quotation from Schnapper, ‘Les rentes chez les théolgiens’, p.  (analysis, pp. -); see also
Langholm, Economics in the Medieval Schools, pp. -; Veraja, Origini della controversia, pp. -,
-.
6 Veraja, Origini della controversia, pp. -; Noonan, Scholastic Analysis of Usury, pp. -;  Lang-
holm, Economics in the Medieval Schools, pp. -.
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because the uncertainty of the buyer’s date of death made the return
on a rente uncertain, the contract was not usurious. Most contended,
as had Innocent IV, that the legitimacy of such contracts should be
judged against the canon law on ‘just price’ rather than on usury, espe-
cially if the annual payments were made in kind rather than money.1 In
the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, numerous Scholastic
treatises – written by Gervais de Mont Saint-Eloi, Matthew d’Aqua-
sparta, Godfrey of Fontaines, Richard of Middleton, and Alexander
Lombard, among others – endorsed both the census and the related
rente contracts.2
The principle governing the theological discussion was that anyone
who purchased a rente was denied the right to demand repayment of
the principal sum, so long as the seller or débirentier honoured the obli-
gation to make the annual annuity payments for which he had pledged
all of his assets. If crédirentiers were given the right of redemption, their
rentes became merely a sinful device to cloak a usurious loan. Thus,
since the rente was not to be repaid, no loan was involved, and, to
quote the Leuven theologian Leonardius Lessius (d. ), ‘where
there is no loan there is no usury’ (ubi non est mutuum, ibi non est
usura).3 A crédirentier who wished to regain some or all of the principal
had to find a third party willing to buy the rente, with its annual in-
come, often at a discount.4 Only when reliable, efficient secondary
markets developed, with untrammelled rights of negotiability and low
transaction costs, would the public find rentes to be an attractive
investment.
The more pressing issue in the later Middle Ages was the right of
redemption on the part of the seller, especially débirentier municipal-
ities. Their problems were aggravated during the Hundred Years War
(-), with its economic contractions and periodic economic
crises, caused not only by the fighting but also by plague and other dis-
ruptions to the international economy, when many municipalities
found themselves without sufficient revenues to meet their annual rent
charges. Thus, they sought the legal right to redeem them. Goslar had
claimed that right as early as , Ghent in , Cologne around
, and subsequently so did a few other towns in France, Imperial
Germany, and the Low Countries: Vienne in , Vienna in ,
Amiens in , Tournai in , Brussels in , and Paris in .
In most other municipalities, however, redemptions were difficult to
achieve without consent from the crédirentiers, who were generally
reluctant to surrender this guaranteed source of income. In the later
1 Veraja, Origini della controversia, pp. -, -; Schnapper, ‘Les rentes chez les théologiens’,
pp. -; Langholm, Economics in the Medieval Schools, pp. -.
2 Veraja, Origini della controversia, pp. -, -, -; Schnapper, ‘Les rentes chez les
théologiens’, pp. -; Noonan, Scholastic Analysis of Usury, pp. -.
3 Quoted in R. de Roover, Leonardius Lessius als economist: de economische leerstellingen en van de latere
scholastiek in de Zuikdelijke Nederlanden (Brussels, ), p. ; see also, p. .
4 See Schnapper, Les rentes au XVIe siècle, pp. -.
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fourteenth century, theologians in Vienne strongly objecting to such
redemptions on principle, cited the injury to ecclesiastical institutions
dependent on income from rentes.1
In , when the council of Constance was asked to determine the
status of rentes and of the right of redemption, all of the commissioners
consulted, seven jurists and four theologians, ruled that rentes were licit
and that the débirentier had the right to redeem them, provided that the
amount equalled at least the nominal purchase value. Finally, three
papal bulls, influenced by the debates at Constance, issued by Martin
V (r. -) (Regimini, ), Nicholas V (r. -) (Sollicitudo
pastoralis, ), and Calixtus III (r. -) (Regimini, ) overcame
any remaining moral, legal, and ecclesiastical doubts. Martin V’s bull,
confirmed by Calixtus III, limited the validity of rentes to those based
on real estate. Thus, the crucial bull was Nicholas V’s, which recog-
nized the validity of rentes based merely on the assets or patrimony of
the vendor, and which had been influenced by the quodlibet that
Willem II Bont of Leuven issued in  in refutation of Henry of
Ghent’s Quodlilbets.2 According to these bulls, census or rente contracts
were licit under three conditions: that the contracts be tied to real
estate, or to other real property; that the annual return or annuity
payments not exceed  per cent of the capital sum (almost never
observed); and that the débirentier (but not the crédirentier) have an
unrestricted right of redemption.
Fortunately for the financial future of western European municipal-
ities – and for the financial revolution – the theological controversy
sparked by the resort of northern French towns to rentes in order to
finance their long-term debts was resolved in their favour. The histor-
ical literature suggests that the taint of usury disappeared only with
issue of the three fifteenth-century papal bulls.3 Other than resolving
the issue of redemption, however, the bulls did little more than ratify
the decrees that Innocent IV had issued less than twenty-five years
after the experiment with rentes began.
The first documented issue of municipal rentes took place at Troyes,
the leading town of the Champagne Fairs, just before , when
several Artesian financiers from Arras and St Quentin acknowledged
1 Fryde, ‘Public Credit’, pp. -; H. Van Werveke, De Gentsche stadsfinanciën in de middeleeuwen
(Brussels, ), pp. -; Schnapper, ‘Les rentes chez les théologiens’, pp. -; Schnapper, Les
rentes au XVIe siècle, pp. -, -.
2 Schnapper, ‘Les rentes chez les théologiens’, pp. -; Schnapper, Les rentes au XVIe siècle, pp.
-; Noonan, Scholastic Analysis of Usury, pp. -, -, -; P. Godding, ‘Wilhelmi Bont
Lovaniensis de redditibus perpetuis et ad vitam ()’, Tijdschrift voor rechtsgeschiedenis/Revue d’his-
toire du droit/The Legal History Review, lviii (), -. The maximum rates actually ranged from
/ (. per cent) to / (. per cent).
3 See Usher, Early History of Deposit Banking, p. ; Fryde, ‘Public Credit’, p. ; H. Van der Wee,
‘Monetary, Credit, and Banking Systems’, in The Cambridge Economic History of Europe: V: The Eco-
nomic Organization of Early Modern Europe, ed. E. E. Rich and C. Wilson (Cambridge, ), pp. -
.
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the purchase of a series of rentes viagères.1 Four years later, in Decem-
ber , Troyes sold a further  rentes viagères,  of them to finan-
ciers from Rheims. The more interesting provisions allowed each
crédirentier to sell his rentes to a third party; or, on his death, to transfer
his claim to his wife, who would receive half of the annual income.2 In
, the commune of Auxerre also issued rentes viagères, many of
them, too, bought by Rheims financiers.3 The earliest extant financial
accounts from Arras, from October  to February , indicate
that it sold £, parisis in rentes viagères at /. (that is, at . per
cent) for one or two lives; and that the annual payments on such rentes
accounted for  per cent of Arras’s debt charges.4 Many other north-
ern French towns soon followed suit: Roye in ; Calais in ;
Saint-Riquier in ; and Saint-Omer in .5
In the quasi-independent French county of Flanders to the north,
Douai, the leading Flemish cloth manufacturer during the thirteenth
century, was the first town to issue rentes. Georges Espinas discovered
a document in its archives, dated about , containing a list of
‘rentes que li ville doit a hiretage’ (that is, rentes héritables), and
another, dated March , concerning rentes viagères. After Douai was
forcibly incorporated into the French kingdom in , it continued to
issue rentes héritables, but was not allowed to sell rentes viagères without
royal permission. Those sold were marketed chiefly in Arras, Tournai,
and Valenciennes, and were transferable to the buyer’s wives, children,
and sometimes grandchildren.6
To the north, Flemish-speaking Ghent, which began to sell lijfrenten
in , also found most of its buyers (for sales amounting to £,
parisis) in Arras, whose bankers converted their short-term debt claims
into longer-term renten. Ghent’s sale of erfelijk renten began in July
, when Count Guy de Dampierre issued an ordinance stipulating
that Flemish municipalities had the right to sell (and redeem) renten,
which he undertook to guarantee.7 The guarantees, however, probably
did not extend beyond using his coercive powers to ensure that the
town governments met their annual rent charges. Bruges, too, was
heavily indebted to bankers from Arras, especially members of the
Crespin family. In , they held almost half of Bruges’s steeply
mounting financial obligations: £, parisis of a total debt of
£, parisis, of which £, were in ‘usurious loans’ and
1 P. Bougard and C. Wyffels, Les finances de Calais au XIIIe siècle (Brussels, ), pp. -. I am in-
debted to James Tracy for this reference.
2 Desportes, Reims et les Rémois, pp. -; Fryde, ‘Public Credit’, pp. -.
3 Desportes, Reims et les Rémois, p. .
4 P. Bougard, ‘L’apogée de la ville (-)’, in P. Bougard, Y.-M. Hilaire, and A. Nolibos,
Histoire d’Arras (Arras, ), pp. -. In medieval Europe, percentages were always expressed as
fractions.
5 Van Werveke, Gentsche stadsfinanciën, pp. -, -; Tracy, Financial Revolution, pp. -.
6 G. Espinas, Les finances de la commune de Douai, des origines au XVe siècle (Paris, ), pp. -
(quotation, p. ); see also Fryde, ‘Public Credit’, p. .
7 Van Werveke, Gentsche stadsfinanciën, pp. -, -.
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£, in lijfrenten (. per cent).1 Far less important were issues of
erfelijk renten.2
Much of Flanders was then under French military occupation, as a
consequence of the count’s determination to subdue the mercantile
oligarchies that had long governed the principal Flemish towns; that
policy, dating from , brought him into conflict with his suzerain,
the king of France. Ostensibly responding to complaints from unen-
franchised guild artisans, Guy and his mother, Countess Marguerite of
Constantinople (r. -) overthrew the so-called XXXIX of Ghent
in that year. The other ruling oligarchies, Douai, Lille, Bruges, and
Ypres, immediately sought French royal protection, and the parlement
of Paris restored the XXXIX to office, on condition that it submit to
external financial audits. In , Philip IV installed a French governor
to rule Flanders, and placed the municipal governments under royal
protection. Two years later, in , the parlement of Paris permitted
the Flemish municipalities to suspend further payments to holders of
‘rentes à vie’ who had received more than their original investment,
‘jusques à tant que la commune sera délivrée des debtes’; and by ,
Ghent ceased sales of renten and payments of rent charges for the next
three decades.3
In -, Count Guy again abolished the Ghent XXXIX and allied
with Philip’s chief enemy, Edward I of England (r. -), whose
revenues came chiefly from taxes on wool exports to Flanders,
Europe’s leading cloth producer. In response, Philip invaded Flanders,
seizing half the county in  and the remainder in . The Flem-
ish townsmen and textile-guild militias rose in revolt, and two years
later, in , they vanquished the French at the battle of Kortrijk, a
victory that allowed guildsmen to enter the municipal governments.
Philip IV, however, soon overpowered them and, in , by the truce
of Athis-sur-Orge, he annexed the towns of Lille and Douai and im-
posed large indemnities on the Flemings, who then rejected the truce
and did not make peace with France until .4
Although Ypres resumed payment of rent-charges on its lijfrenten, in
-, Ghent did not do so nor resume the sale of renten – and only
1 See A. Derville, ‘La finance Arrageoise: usure et banque’, in Arras au moyen âge: histoire et littérature,
ed. M.-M. Castellani and J.-P. Martin (Arras, ), pp. -; but his calculations of the data differ
from mine, cited here, and taken from De rekeningen van de stad Brugge, -, ed. C. Wyffels and
J. de Smet (Ghent, -), I: -, -, doc. , for  Sept. - Dec. . See also
Fryde, ‘Public Credit, pp. , -, -.
2 In the account for Sept.  to Dec. , the total payments made to holders of rentes viagères or
lijfrenten (redditus ad vitam) amounted to £,. s. d. parisis ( persons, including Robert and
Baldwin Crespin and Jehan Boinebroke); but payments for rentes héritables (redditu hereditario or rente
yretaule) were only £ ( persons): Wyffels and De Smet, Rekeningen van de stad Brugge, i. .
3 See Bigwood, Régime juridique, i. -, ; ii. - (doc. no. ); Schnapper, ‘Les rentes chez
les théologiens’, p. ; Fryde, ‘Public Credit’, p. .
4 Nicholas, Medieval Flanders, pp. -, -; H. Nowe, La bataille des éperons d’or (Brussels,
), pp. -; Fryde, ‘Public Credit’, pp. -, noting that the Flemings paid the French king
£, parisis between  and .
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erfelijk renten – until , in the middle of another civil war, the Revolt
of Maritime Flanders (-), in which it refused to take part.1 In
almost every year thereafter, until , when the annual treasurer’s
accounts cease to be available for a decade, Ghent sold small amounts
of renten. The annual revenues from these sales, from standard loans
and other debt contracts, and annual expenditures on annuity pay-
ments, renten redemptions, and loan payments are given in Tables 
and .
The most remarkable event recorded in Ghent’s fourteenth-century
municipal accounts took place in the fiscal year -, on the eve of
the Black Death: the issue of lijfrenten worth £, parisis, almost
thirty times the value of erfelijk renten sold that year; but these lijfrenten
were an involuntary conversion of short-term loans.2 During the ‘Arte-
velde era’ (-), when Ghent was ruled by a weaver-led guild
regime, it dominated Flanders, defying the count, Louis de Nevers (r.
-), while antagonizing the other leading Flemish towns.3 These
circumstances may explain the other remarkable feature of this finan-
cial experiment: that almost all of the renten were sold outside
Flanders, in the Brabantine drapery towns of Brussels and Leuven.
Such sales posed, however, the risk that foreign creditors could, in
their native towns, seek the seizure of Ghent merchants and their
goods to enforce payment of annual rent charges, a privilege that
Ghent did not accord to its own citizens.4 Subsequently, in the four-
teenth century, Ghent sold only two more issues of lijfrenten, in more
modest amounts; £, parisis in - and £, parisis in -.
Although a few sales are later recorded in Hainaut, there is no evi-
dence that, in normal years, Ghent was dependent on external sources
to finance its municipal debts. In the more peaceful period stretching
from  through the early s, the sale of erfelijk renten provided,
on average, only . per cent of Ghent’s municipal revenues.5 Late
1 Comptes de la ville d’Ypres de  à , ed. G. Des Marez and E. De Sagher (Brussels, -), i.
 (-), - (-); and for arrears on rentes in -, see pp. , -; see also
Fryde, ‘Public Credit’, p. . Since no other municipal accounts were published before the destruc-
tion of Ypres’ archives in the First World War, no further accounts are available until , when the
set of duplicate copies for the Chambre des Comptes, now housed in the national archives in Brus-
sels, commence. The published sources for Ghent’s municipal accounts are provided in Tables  and
; and so far I have analysed its accounts for only the fourteenth century. For the fifteenth century,
see M. Boone, Geld en macht: de Gentse stadsfinanciën en de Bourgondische staatsvorming (-)
(Ghent, ), pp. -, , and Table  (sales of lijf- and erfrenten, but only for the years -).
This book regrettably pays almost no attention to this form of civic finances. But see also M. Boone,
‘Plus deuil que joie: Les ventes de rentes par la ville de Gand pendant la période bourguignonne: entre
intérêts privés et finances publiques’, Credit Communal: bulletin trimestriel, clxxvi (-), -.
2 Van Werveke, Gentsche Stadsfinanciën, pp. -; Fryde, ‘Public Credit’, pp. -.
3 See D. Nicholas, The Van Arteveldes of Ghent: The Varieties of Vendetta and the Hero in History
(Ithaca, ), pp. -; Nicholas, Medieval Flanders, pp. -.
4 See Fryde, ‘Public Credit’, pp. , .
5 De rekeningen der stad Gent: Tijdvak van Jacob Van Artevelde, -, ed. N. De Pauw and J.
Vuylsteke (Ghent, -), ii. -, -; iii. -; Gentse stads- en baljuwsrekeningen (-),
ed. A. Van Werveke (Brussels, ), pp. , , , , -, , , , , , , and
; Van Werveke, De Gentsche stadsfinanciën, pp. -.
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fourteenth-century municipal accounts indicate that the normal rate of
return on erfelijk renten was . per cent.
A different, more interesting picture emerges from the municipal
finances of the small towns, in particular Aalst (Alost), of eastern
Imperial Flanders, mid-way between Ghent and Brussels. The role of
renten in Aalst’s finances for the period from - (the year of the
first extant account) to - is shown in Table .1 There are fewer
gaps than in the Ghent accounts, and almost all of the extant accounts
are complete. The table provides the following data: first, quinquennial
means of the revenues derived from the annual sales of both erfelijk
renten and lijfrenten; second, the percentages of total revenues ac-
counted for by the sales of each type of renten; third, the annual muni-
cipal disbursements on both annuity payments and redemptions;
fourth, the percentage of total municipal expenditures each year ac-
counted for by these renten payments; fifth, the total annual surpluses
or deficits; sixth, annual revenues from the sale of tax-farms for the
excise taxes (assises, accijnzen) on the consumption of beer, wine, grain,
bread, textiles, and other commodities; and seventh, the total expendi-
tures on renten (annuities and redemptions) as a percentage of such
annual excise tax-farm revenues.
Only in calamitous years of plague and war such as - and
- do renten expenditures exceed revenues from tax-farms; and, for
the first half of the sixteenth century, they rarely total more than  per
cent. On the other hand, both receipts from, and payments made for,
renten usually account for a higher proportion of municipal revenue
and expenditure than in fourteenth-century Ghent. If erfelijk renten
were the predominant form in Ghent, lijfrenten were more important in
Aalst, usually by a : ratio. Finally, the market for lijfrenten was
remarkably broad given the small size of the town. For example, the
account for - records annuity payments to  recipients.
The evidence from the municipal accounts of Ghent and Aalst (and
from Leuven in Brabant) confirms a dichotomy in the source of the
annual payments for the two major kinds of rentes, first noticed by
Bruno Kuske.2 In accordance with the popes’ rulings, payments for
rentes héritables (erfelijk renten) had to be derived from real estate or
some other form of immobile property; but those for rentes viagères
(lijfrenten) were derived from excise or consumption taxes, or from
annual sales of tax-farms (pachten) for such accijnzen. Note that tax was
levied on consumption of products of the land: wine, beer, grain,
bread, meat, herring, wool and linen textiles, charcoal, and wood, as
indicated in Table .
In the neighbouring, though economically less developed, duchy of
1 Municipal treasurer’s accounts, Brussels, Algemeen Rijksarchief, Rekenkamer (Chambre de
Comptes), Aalst Stadsrekeningen (-): nos. ,-.
2 Kuske, Schuldenwesen der deutschen Städte, pp. -.
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Brabant to the east, two textile-manufacturing towns sold renten from
the early fourteenth century: Brussels (the capital) from about 
and Leuven from . Unfortunately, no medieval municipal ac-
counts are available for Brussels; those for Leuven, available only from
, do not supply adequate data on municipal finances before ,
when evidence for the sales of lijfrenten and erfelijk renten are available
in voluminous detail.1 Leuven’s municipal government sold the former
at rates that also averaged . per cent; and, following the standard
practice in the Low Countries, it financed the annual renten payments
from the sale of excise-tax farms.
At the higher comital and ducal levels of government, first the
counts of Holland, from , and then the counts of Flanders, from
the time of Louis de Male (r. -), also raised public funds from
the sales of renten secured against aides and other payments received
from the towns. These counts chose, however, to have the municipal
governments sell the renten on their behalf for two reasons: first,
because they had already established effective market procedures, with
a reliable corps of financial agents; second, and more important, to
quote Edmund Fryde, because ‘few medieval princes could be trusted
to pay annuities for a long period to a mere money-lender.’2 The prac-
tice was followed by the counts of Hainaut, the dukes of Brabant, and
the dukes of Burgundy, after their partial unification of the Low
Countries in -. Both municipal and princely renten were sold
freely to willing buyers, with the few exceptions noted previously, with-
out the coercion that characterized Italian, later French and Habsburg
public finance. In the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries,
most other towns in France, the Low Countries, and Germany
adopted rentes as an increasingly important, if not the primary, vehicle
for public finance.3
Most late medieval northern European towns that did so tried to
claim the right to redeem rentes whenever they wished. In November
, imperial edicts issued by Emperor Charles V granted this right to
municipalities throughout the duchy of Brabant and, in February ,
to those throughout the county of Flanders. Reichspolizei-ordnungen
issued in , , and  applied the principle to towns situated
east of the Rhine.4 By the early sixteenth century, the Habsburg
1 Van Uytven, Stadsfinanciën, pp. -; and for some annual lists of lijfrenten, see also Tables
XIVA and B (-), pp. -; XV (), p. ; XVI (), pp. -; XVII ( and ),
p. ; XVIII (-), p. ; XIX (), pp. -. The rates (Table XIII, pp. -) were
from . to . per cent. See also the treasurer’s accounts in Leuven, Stedelijk Archief, Archief
van het Oude Regime, stadsrekeningen -, nos. -.
2 Fryde, ‘Public Credit’, p.  (quotation), and p. .
3 See Fryde, ‘Public Credit’, pp. -, -, -; Kuske, Schuldenwesen der deutschen Städten,
p. ; G. Parker, ‘The Emergence of Modern Finance in Europe, -’, in The Fontana Eco-
nomic History of Europe: II: The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, ed. C. Cipolla (London, ), pp.
-; Hocquet, ‘City State’, pp. -; Tracy, Financial Revolution, pp. -.
4 Schnapper, Les rentes au XVIe siècle, pp. - (and n. ); Van der Wee, ‘Monetary, Credit, and
Banking Systems’, p. ; Fryde, ‘Public Credit’, pp. -.
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Emperor, French kings, and princes in the Low Countries had all
affirmed their powers to regulate municipal public finances, especially
rentes, and the municipal taxes that were used to pay annual rent
charges. But this method of financing governments still remained
municipal, because only municipalities sold rentes, so that the national
institutions required for a funded, permanent public debt had yet to be
created. Despite the precocity of northern municipalities in utilizing
rentes for their public finances, the first national monarchy to establish
a permanent, funded national debt based on rentes, by the early six-
teenth century, was in southern Europe: not Italy, of course, which
became unified as a national monarchy only in , but the newly
unified Habsburg kingdom of Spain.
_____________________________________________________________
N  T 1 and 1:
* Debt payments: the sum of annual annuity payments, redemptions of renten, and repayments of
bonded loans. The accounts rarely distinguished clearly between such payments, grouping all under
the expenditure accounts entitled van schulde ende van renten.
Many of the town accounts or stadsrekeningen for fourteenth-century Ghent are missing; many of
these still surviving are fragmentary; and in some cases the town treasurer failed to fill in the total
sum of receipts and or expenditures. With so many lacunae, these quinquennial means should be
used with some considerable reservation. As an alternative, Table  provides extant data for
individual years from  to , relatively peaceful years.
S:
Gentsche stads- en baljuwsrekeningen, - / Comptes de la ville de Gand, -, ed. J. Vuylsteke,
in the series Oorkondenboek der stad Gent, eerste afdeeling: Rekeningen [Cartulaire de la ville de Gand,
première série: Comptes] (Ghent, ). The accounts begin, in fact, only in -; and many are
fragmentary.
De rekeningen der stad Gent: Tijdvak van Jacob Van Artevelde, -, ed. N. De Pauw and J.
Vuylsteke (Ghent, -); I: -; II: -; III: -.
Gentse stads- en baljuwsrekeningen (-), ed. A. Van Werveke, Koninklijke Academie voor
Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten van België, Koninklijke Commissie voor Geschiedenis
(Brussels, ), with an introduction by H. Van Werveke.
Gentse stads- en baljuwsrekeningen (-), ed. D. Nicholas and W. Prevenier, Koninklijke Academie
van België, Koninklijke Commissie voor Geschiedenis (Brussels, ).
De rekeningen der stad Gent: Tijdvak van Philips van Artevelde, -, ed. J. Vuylsteke (Ghent, ).
The manuscript sources may be found in: Stadsarchief Gent, Stadsrekeningen, series  (continuing
into the early modern era).
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* * * * *
In view of the successful use of rentes in so many municipalities in
north-western Europe, one may wonder why the economically and
politically powerful Italian city states made no use of them in the later-
medieval era, especially cities still relying on short-term floating debt
rather than the monte system. The first Italian issue of rentes, in the
form of life annuities paying  per cent, took place in Venice, in ,
but sold by the mint (Zecca) rather than the municipality. Then, in
, during the war with the Ottomans, the mint issued perpetual but
redeemable annuities at  per cent. They turned out to be a temporary
device: from  to , the municipality spent more than ten mil-
lion ducats to redeem all of the outstanding annuities that the mint had
issued in its own name.1
The Italian experience is the more surprising in the light of the late
medieval history of municipal public finances in the towns of the
Crown of Aragon, including Catalonia, whose finances were also mark-
edly different from those in the municipalities of neighbouring Langue-
doc. The Aragonese municipal finances, in fact, provided the model
that Habsburg Spain adopted for its national public debt. The rente or
census contract, under the name of censal or censuale, had long been
used in Aragon as an instrument of private finance; it first came under
Crown regulation in . Barcelona and other Catalan towns, in
return for their agreement in  to raise royal aides, gained the ‘right’
to borrow or raise funds themselves, but only with royal assent: it was
refused once, in . Though the date of the first issue of censals is
unknown, Barcelona sold two forms during its financial crisis of the
late s and s, certainly after its war with Genoa in -: the
censal mort, a perpetual, hereditary annuity with an annual payment of
. per cent;2 and the violari (censal vitalicio), a life annuity (com-
monly for two lives) with an annual payment, exactly double, of .
per cent. Alzira sold censals and violaris from ; Valencia from ;
and both Gandía and Gerona from .3 The same year, in return for
financial support in the war with Castile, Peter IV, king of Aragon and
count of Barcelona (r. -), reconfirmed the towns’ privileges to
raise funds by issuing interest-bearing loans (usuras e mogubells) and
1 See Lane, ‘Public Debt and Private Wealth’, pp. -.
2 Y. Roustit, ‘La consolidation de la dette publique à Barcelone au milieu du XIVe siècle’, Estudios de
historia moderna, iv (), -, incorrectly ascribes the origins to Venetian public finance which
was still based on forced loans, or prestiti ); and Usher, Early History of Deposit Banking, pp. -,
-, makes no mention of the sales of censals and violaris before , incorrectly stating, on p.
, that Barcelona’s permanent funded debt commenced in that year. See also J. Broussolle, ‘Les
impositions municipales de Barcelone de  à ’, Estudios de historia moderna, v (), -,
indicating (pp. -) that the Genoese war was responsible for establishing the excise taxes that were
used to finance the censals.
3 A. Furió, ‘Crédito y endeudamiento: el censal en la sociedad rural valenciana (siglos XIV-XV)’, in
Señorío y feudalismo en la península Ibérica (ss. XII-XIX), ed. E. Sarasa Sánchez and E. Serrano Martín
(Zaragoza, ), i. -, esp. pp. -.
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Renten as % of
Total
-  [,.] n.a.
-  ,. ,. .
-  ,. ,. .
-  [,.] n.a.
July-Aug.   ,. ,. .
-  [,.] n.a.
-  ,. ,. .
-  ,. ,. .
-  ,. ,. .
-  ,. ,. .
-  ,. ,. .
-  ,. ,. .
-  ,. ,. .
-  ,. ,. .
-  ,. ,. .
-  ,. ,. .
-  ,. ,. .
-  ,. ,. .
 ,. ,,. .
S:
Gentse stads- en baljuwsrekeningen (-), ed. A. Van Werveke, Koninklijke Academie voor Weten-
schappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten van België, Koninklijke Commissie voor Geschiedenis
(Brussels, ), with an introduction by H. Van Werveke.
Gentse stads- en baljuwsrekeningen (-), ed. D. Nicholas and W. Prevenier, Koninklijke Academie
van België, Koninklijke Commissie voor Geschiedenis (Brussels, ).
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censals morts and violaris, and by levying excise or consumption taxes to
fund the annual payments.1 By the s, the issues had become a
standard feature of Aragonese municipal finances. In Alzira, the capital
value of censals issued rose from £, Barcelonese in - to
£, in -.2 With few exceptions (Perpignan in  and
), the municipalities sold the censals without compulsion; and like
many northern towns, they retained the right to redeem them at will.3
The censals could also be resold to third parties, though only through
the agency of municipal officials and notaries public.4 By the fifteenth
century, censals had displaced floating debts of short-term loans in
most of the Aragonese municipalities.5
In neighbouring Castile-Léon, King Henry II (r. -) authorized
the first issue of similar censals, sometime after . By the fifteenth
century, according to Abbott Payson Usher, even though ‘they became
commercialized and were used as a fiscal resource’, we have ‘no know-
ledge of the amounts issued or the rates of interest paid’, and no such
information has been provided in subsequent monographs on Castilian
financial history.6
The history of Spain’s permanent funded debt begins in , when
King Ferdinand II of Aragon (r. -) and Queen Isabella of
Castile (r. -) sold a series of hereditary, perpetual, and re-
deemable rentes, known as juros de heredad, to finance the war with
Granada that led to the quasi-unification of their territories in .7
These issues paid  per cent, while subsequent ones paid between 
and  per cent, and were funded by royal excise taxes from the rentas
ordinaris. From the beginning of continuous records, in , to the
end of Ferdinand’s reign in , Spain’s funded debt rose modestly,
from . million ducats (escudos of  silver maravedís) to .
million ducats. Between the accession of Charles V as emperor in 
(abdicated ) and the death of his son Philip II in , the debt
ballooned to . million ducats,8 much of which was held abroad.
1 For Barcelona, see Usher, Early History of Deposit Banking, pp. -, . These rates were in ef-
fect in the budget of -, when the sale of both types of rentes accounted for . per cent of
Barcelona’s revenues, while the annual payment on the rentes (£,. for censals and £,.
for the violaris) accounted for . per cent of total expenditures. In , the king authorized sales of
rentes at / (. per cent) and / (. per cent); but by , Barcelona was paying only .
per cent.
2 Furió, ‘Crédito y endeudamiento’, Table III, p. . In -, Alzira’s new issues amounted to a
total of only £,; but in Cullera, to a sum of £,.
3 Roustit, ‘Dette publique’, pp. -. The rate of return was / (. per cent).
4 Ibid., pp. -.
5 See Usher, Early History of Deposit Banking, pp. -.
6 Ibid., pp. -; J. H. Elliott, Imperial Spain, - (New York, ), pp. -; J. Gelabert,
‘Castile: -’, in Rise of the Fiscal State, ed. Bonney, pp. -; G. Tortella and F. Comín,
‘Fiscal and Monetary Institutions in Spain (-)’, in Transferring Wealth, ed. Bordo and
Cortés-Conde, pp. -.
7 Usher, Early History of Deposit Banking, p. ; Elliott, Imperial Spain, p. . The word juro means
‘I swear’.
8 Van der Wee, ‘Monetary, Credit, and Banking Systems’, pp. -, table . See also Usher, Early
History of Deposit Banking, table , p. , which shows a rise in the Spanish funded debt from .
 John H. Munro
Despite its primacy in becoming the first national monarchy to
establish a permanent funded debt, based on marketable annuities,
and despite its considerable success in creating one of such magnitude,
Habsburg Spain cannot claim credit for providing the foundations for
the modern financial revolution. One may cavil that the debt was not
the responsibility of Habsburg Spain, but rather of one of its com-
ponents, albeit by far the largest: the kingdom of Castile. The far more
important reason, however, is that not all of this debt arose from the
voluntary purchase of annuities. On three occasions, in , , and
, Philip II’s government defaulted on the interest payments owing
on short-term loans known as asientos, and compelled the creditors to
exchange them for the much-lower-yielding  per cent perpetual but
redeemable juros al quittar; and in , the first conversion led to a fall
in the market price of juros from par () to .1 The costs of ser-
vicing this Castilian debt became an increasingly severe burden, con-
suming  per cent of the revenues from the rentas ordinaris by ,
and  per cent by .2 Nevertheless, the Castilian government never
defaulted on its annuity annual payments for the juros al quittar. The
financial record of the annuity payments and the ease with which juros
could be transferred to foreigners living abroad explain why they
became such a favoured international investment vehicle.
According to Paul Cawès and Earl Hamilton, the first national
monarchy to create the required institutions for a permanent funded
national debt was France. In September , on behalf of Francis I (r.
-), the chancellor, Antoine Duprat, received from a consortium
of Paris merchants the sum of £, tournois from the sale of rentes
issued by the Prévôt des marchands et échevins (aldermen) of the Hôtel
de Ville, which paid the annual annuities of . per cent from its ad-
ministration of specified royal excise (consumption) taxes and gabelles.3
There are several grounds on which to dispute this claim. First, the
debt was again not national: its structure showed that investors still
preferred to lend to municipal rather than state governments, in the
expectation that the city of Paris could be compelled to honour its
financial obligations, whereas the Crown could not. Second, many of
the rentes purchased in the sixteenth century were in reality forced
loans. Third, resistance to the right of redemption of rentes remained
stronger in France than elsewhere in northern Europe: only in  did
        
million ducats in  to one of . million ducats in ; and A. Castillo, ‘Dette flottante et
dette consolidée en Espagne de  à ’, Annales: Économies, sociétés, civilisations, xviii (),
- (especially graph II, p. ), which provides a third set of figures: from  million ducats in
 to  million ducats in .
1 R. T. Davies, The Golden Century of Spain, - (London, ;  repr. New York, ), p. .
2 Elliott, Imperial Spain, pp. -; Gelabert, ‘Castile’, pp. -; Tortella and Comín, ‘Fiscal and
Monetary Institutions’, pp. -.
3 See Hamilton, ‘Origin and Growth’, pp. -; and Cawès, ‘Les commencements du crédit public
en France’, pp. -, -; Revue d’économie politique, x (), -. See also Schnapper, Les
rentes au XVIe siècle, pp. -; M. Wolfe, The Fiscal System of Renaissance France (New Haven, ),
pp. -.
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Francis I, by royal decree, extend to towns throughout the kingdom,
and to the Crown itself, the restricted right to redeem rentes secured on
buildings and vacant properties. The parlement of Paris limited the
right of redemption to thirty years from the date of issue, and extended
the limit to sixty years only in .1 Fourth, although rentes were
assignable in France to third parties, the cumbersome and costly pro-
cedure required both parties (or their attorneys) to appear before a
licensed notary public. As a result, during the sixteenth and early
seventeenth centuries, no true secondary market existed in these secur-
ities, which were not negotiable by any modern definition of the term.2
Finally, the Crown’s frequent failure to make the annual payments on
the various rentes drastically reduced their values; and in the s, for
example, the very few buyers demanded discounts of  per cent.3
Throughout the sixteenth century, the French state mismanaged its
new financial instrument; and it continued to rely heavily on interest-
bearing loans, many of them also forced, imposed despite its continued
denunciation of usury, as late as . According to Martin Wolfe,
Francis I ‘did not like this form of credit [the rente] and he used it
sparingly’. During his reign, his infrequent sales of rentes raised only
£, tournois (equal to just one year’s gabelles). Even though the
annuity rate of . per cent was lower than the rates paid on short-
term debts, the Crown feared that perpetual annuity payments would
reduce and permanently alienate its revenues.4 His successor, Henry II
(r. -), took an opposite view and, during his twelve-year reign,
he raised £. million tournois from national sales of royal rentes. From
, they were issued almost every year, along with periodic forced
loans; the sales from , amounting to £. million tournois, were
forced upon wealthy Parisians in defiance of the parlement.5 Henry
was also responsible, in , for establishing the infamous Grand Parti
de Lyon, which converted £. million tournois of short-term debts into
a consolidated fund, to be repaid in  instalments (at  per cent quar-
terly) at each of the quarterly Lyons Fairs. In November , after
defeat at the battle of St Quentin, the Crown temporarily suspended
payments. After peace was restored at Cateau-Cambrésis in April ,
a proposed new Petit Parti, totalling £. million tournois (at  per
cent), was unsuccessful, and both debt conversions and interest pay-
ments ceased with Henry’s death in July .6
1 Cf. Schnapper, Les rentes au XVIe siècle, pp. -, -, p. , that from , in effect, all rentes
finally became redeemable at the will of the débirentier issuer.
2 Schnapper, Les rentes au XIVe siècle, pp. -.
3 Wolfe, Fiscal System of Renaissance France, p. ; Tracy, Financial Revolution, pp. -.
4 Wolfe, Fiscal System of Renaissance France, pp. - (quotation on p. ), -; J. Dent, Crisis in
Finance: Crown, Financiers, and Society in Seventeenth-Century France (Newton Abbot, ), pp. -.
5 Wolfe, Fiscal System, p. . Under his successors, Francis II (r. -) and Charles IX (r. -
), rentes amounting to another £. million tournois were sold, some of which were also compul-
sory purchases.
6 Cawès, ‘Crédit public en France’ (), pp. -; Wolfe, Fiscal System of Renaissance France, pp.
-; Parker, ‘Emergence of Modern Finance’, pp. -.
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Hardly more successful was the next royal experiment, the contract
of Poissy of October , by which Charles IX (r. -) compelled
the clergy to pay the Crown annually £. million tournois from their
lands for six years, to repay debts owing on the Grand Parti; and then,
during the next ten years, to pay an additional £. million tournois
annually, to fund £. million tournois in rentes, including new issues
and arrears in annuity payments. Of the total sum demanded, £.
million tournois over sixteen years, only small amounts were either paid
or redeemed. After the outbreak of the Wars of Religion in , which
led many clergy to default on their annual payments, ‘à cause de la
misère et calamité des guerres’,1 Charles IX imposed a new series of
forced loans and also compelled wealthy Parisians to buy new issues of
rentes, on the grounds that previous loans had shown that ‘they were
rich enough.’2
In , when the Wars of Religion had ended in victory for Henry
IV (r. -), rentes, valued at £ million tournois, accounted for
over half of the royal debts: £ million in total; and payments on
much of that debt were in arrears.3 From , his chief minister,
Maximilien de Béthune, duke of Sully, cancelled rentes lacking a veri-
fiable claim, ceased to pay off many of the arrears, spent budget sur-
pluses to redeem some rentes, and forced other rentiers and debt holders
of the Grand Parti to reduce their claims. In , he reduced the
annuity payments on rentes from . per cent to . per cent; in 
the rate was reduced to . per cent.4 A comparison with interest rates
on short-term royal loans is instructive: from  to , the annual
average rate was . per cent.5
* * * * *
The experiences of Spain and France buttresses Tracy’s claim that the
birthplace of the modern financial revolution was instead the Habsburg
Netherlands. From at least , the States of Holland, along with
other provinces of the Habsburg Netherlands, had sponsored the issue
of renten against specific provincial tax revenues, even if, as in the past,
they were sold by each province’s municipalities.6 A report to Charles
1 Cawès, ‘Crédit public en France’ (), p. .
2 Wolfe, Fiscal System of Renaissance France, p.  (quotation); Schnapper, Les rentes au XVIe siècle,
pp. -; Tracy, Financial Revolution, pp. -. More than a dozen forced loans were imposed
from  to . From  to , total sales of rentes amounted to £. million tournois; and
from  to , approximately another £ million tournois in rentes were sold.
3 Schnapper, Les rentes au XVIe siècle, pp. -; Wolfe, Fiscal System of Renaissance France, pp. -
, ; Cawès, ‘Crédit public en France’ (), pp. -.
4 Wolfe, Fiscal System of Renaissance France, pp. -; R. Bonney, The King’s Debts: Finance and
Politics in France, - (Oxford, ), pp. , -.
5 See Bonney, King’s Debts, table VII, pp. -; and Dent, Crisis in Finance, pp. -. In -,
interest rates on short-term loans to the French king were about the same:  per cent: Fryde, ‘Public
Credit’, p. .
6 See J. Tracy, Emperor Charles V, Impresario of War: Campaign Strategy, International Finance, and
Domestic Politics (Cambridge, ), pp. -; and Tracy, Financial Revolution, pp. -.
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V’s government on Holland’s finances for the fiscal years  to 
indicates that revenues from the sales of renten accounted for . per
cent of the province’s total income, . per cent of which came from
subsidies, taxes voted by the States. The annuity rate on losrenten was
still . per cent, the prevailing rate from the mid-fifteenth century.1
An important change took place in December , on the outbreak
of war with France, when Lodewijk van Schore, president of the coun-
cil of state for the regent, Mary of Hungary (r. -), convinced the
States General to agree to new financial expedients (nieuwe middelen): a
 per cent tax on income from both real property (including renten)
and trade and a  per cent ad valorem tax on exports, to enable the
seventeen provinces to fund new issues of renten, while retaining the
existing excise taxes on consumption, on items such as beer, wine, and
cloth. Tracy shows that the States, as Mary predicted, ‘took control of
the new revenues’, which allowed them ‘to create a new type of long-
term debt [in renten], resting on secure foundations and capable of vast
expansion’.2 So successful were the new renten (issued at . per cent)
and the taxes used to fund them, that by  Holland’s government
had redeemed the issues of -, to the relief of everyone con-
strained to buy them as a public duty in time of war. The success per-
suaded Mary, in October , to forgo coercion in marketing renten
within Holland; elsewhere, at Bruges for example, renten had been sold
within a free market. In contrast to France’s fiscal misfortunes, the
Habsburg States did not suspend payments on any of its renten before
the outbreak of the revolt in the Netherlands in , which led to the
creation of the Republic of the United Provinces, better known as the
Dutch Republic, with the Union of Utrecht in .3 Subsequently, it
would establish a better claim for creating the foundations of a national
public debt, in the context of the modern financial revolution, since
the Habsburg Netherlands was not a national state, but a collection of
seventeen provinces.
The success of the renten issued in the Habsburg Netherlands and of
the juros al quittar issued in Habsburg Spain rested upon the develop-
ment of secondary financial markets following the opening of the
Antwerp bourse in . Trade there in juros and renten became one of
the principal activities of South German merchant-banking houses led
by the Fuggers, Welsers, Höchstetters, Herwarts, Imhofs, and
Tuchers.4 As Herman Van der Wee comments, the sixteenth-century
1 Tracy, Financial Revolution, pp. -. See table , p. , for the series of Holland’s renten, labelled
series A to N, secured by the beden from   to  (and issued by Amsterdam and five other lead-
ing cities).
2 Quotations from Tracy, Charles V, p. ; and Tracy, Financial Revolution, pp. -.
3 Tracy, Charles V, pp. -; Tracy, Financial Revolution, pp. -, -. For renten funded by the
States of Holland in , , and , see table , p. ; for the subseqent renten from  to
 ( issues), with interest rates alternating between . and . per cent, see table , p. .
4 R. Ehrenberg, Capital and Finance in the Age of the Renaissance: A Study of the Fuggers and Their
Connections, trans. from the German by H. M. Lucas (New York, ; repr. New York, ), pp.
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‘age of the Fuggers and [then] of the Genoese was one of spectacular
growth in public finances’.1 In , a second bourse for international
trade in both commodities and securities was established in Amster-
dam, capital of the United Provinces in the northern Netherlands.
Such secondary markets depended in turn upon the adoption in the
Habsburg Netherlands between  and  of fully fledged negoti-
ability: legal sanctions to protect the property rights of third-party
creditors (assignees) and to permit discounting of bills without running
afoul of the usury laws.
* * * * *
The road to negotiability lay through the evolution of a second instru-
ment of credit, the bill of exchange, which replaced the earlier instru-
mentum ex causa cambii or lettre de foire of the Champagne Fairs.
According to Raymond de Roover, thirteenth-century Italian mer-
chants had created the bill of exchange to provide another method of
evading the usury ban. It achieved this objective by disguising the
interest rate within an exchange rate that was ‘artificially’ raised in
favour of the ‘lender’.2 In his view, however, one seldom noted in the
literature, this financial operation ‘increased both trouble and expense’,
so that ‘the practical result of the usury prohibition, intended to
protect the borrower, was to raise the cost of borrowing’.3
Whereas the instrumentum ex causa cambii was a formal, notarized
loan contract, the bill of exchange was an informal letter of payment
that concerned financial transactions between two principals in one
city and their two agents in a second, foreign city. The principal mer-
chant or financier in the first city (the taker or prenditore), having
received investment funds or funds for remittance from the second
principal (the deliverer or datore), ‘drew’ a bill (cambium) upon his resi-
dent payer agent in the second city, instructing him to make payment
on his behalf to the deliverer’s payee agent.4 If the first city was, say,
Florence, and the second London, the letter would specify the receipt
of funds in florins and stipulate repayment in pounds sterling, at a
        
-.
1 Van der Wee, ‘Monetary, Credit, and Banking Systems’, pp. -; see also H. Van der Wee,
‘European Banking in the Middle Ages and Early Modern Period (-)’, in A History of Euro-
pean Banking, nd ed., ed. H. Van der Wee and G. Kurgan-Van Hentenrijk (Antwerp, ), pp.
-.
2 See, esp., R. de Roover, ‘Le contrat de change depuis la fin du treizième siècle jusqu’au début du
dix-septième’, Revue belge de philologie et d’histoire, xxv (-), -; L’évolution de la lettre de
change, XIVe-XVIIIe siècles (Paris, ), pp. -; ‘New Interpretations of the History of Banking’,
Journal of World History, ii (), -; and ‘Early Banking before  and the Development of
Capitalism’, Review of the History of Banking, iv (), -.
3 R. de Roover, The Rise and Decline of the Medici Bank, - (Cambridge, MA, ), p. . See
also J. H. Munro, ‘Bullionism and the Bill of Exchange in England, -: A Study in Monetary
Management and Popular Prejudice’, in The Dawn of Modern Banking, ed. Center for Medieval and
Renaissance Studies, UCLA (New Haven, ), pp. -.
4 For examples, see de Roover, Money, Banking, and Credit in Mediaeval Bruges, pp. , .
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specified exchange rate, on a specified date (usance), usually three
months after the bill had been drawn. For the bill to be valid, the payee
(beneficiario) agent had first to present the bill to the payer (pagatore)
agent, in order to obtain his written assent, in the form of words
acknowledging ‘acceptance’ on the back; then he had to present it a
second time, for redemption, on the maturity date. After receiving the
funds, the payee agent in London bought a second bill of exchange
(recambium), drawn upon a Florentine merchant banker (payer), in
order to remit the funds to the original deliverer; and he instructed the
acceptor-payer to make payment in florins to the deliverer as the desig-
nated payee, at a specified exchange rate on the English pound sterling.
So far as theologians and canon lawyers were concerned, there was
nothing inherently usurious about bills of exchange, so long as the
second set of exchange rates was not predetermined, so that the deliv-
erer bore the risk that the rates might alter adversely. However, if both
sets of rates on both the cambium and the recambium were fixed, the
contract was clearly usurious, and was known as cambio secco (‘dry
exchange’).1 Some regarded the bill of exchange simply as an emptio-
venditio contract for the purchase and sale of foreign bank balances.
But some secular authorities, the English in particular, regarded any
bills of exchange with grave suspicions: as ‘dampnable bargaynes
groundyt in usurye’, as stated in the preamble to a statute of  that
provided new measures for a more vigorous enforcement of the anti-
usury laws.2
The bill of exchange was not only a loan instrument but also a
remittance contract that ‘transferred funds’, or more accurately,
effected payments between distant cities without any movement of
precious metals between them, as demonstrated in the previous
example. The risk of losses in transporting precious metals – from
robbery by land, piracy at sea, and confiscation by government – grew
dramatically from the s with the rise in the warfare throughout the
Mediterranean basin and western Europe that ultimately led to the
Hundred Years War.3 The rising costs of financing such warfare,
whether offensive or defensive, led to the combination of monetary and
1 See R. de Roover: ‘What is Dry Exchange? A Contribution to the Study of English Mercantilism’,
Journal of Political Economy, lii (), -; R. de Roover, ‘Scholastic Economics: Survival and
Lasting Influence from the Sixteenth Century to Adam Smith’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, lxix
(), -; R. de Roover, ‘Cambium ad Venetias: Contributions to the History of Foreign
Exchange’, in Studi in onore di Armando Sapori, ed. Istituto Editoriale Cisalpino (Milan, ), i. -
; Noonan, Scholastic Analysis of Usury, pp. -.
2 In: Statute  Henrici VII. c. : in Statutes of the Realm, ed. Great Britain, Record Commission
(T. E. Tomlins, J. Raithby, et al.) (London, -), ii. .
3 J. H. Munro, ‘Industrial Transformations in the North-West European Textile Trades, c.-
c.: Economic Progress or Economic Crisis?’, in Before the Black Death: Studies in the ‘Crisis’ of the
Early Fourteenth Century, ed. B. M. Campbell (Manchester and New York, ), pp. -; J. H.
Munro, ‘The “New Institutional Economics” and the Changing Fortunes of Fairs in Medieval and
Early Modern Europe: The Textile Trades, Warfare, and Transaction Costs’, Vierteljahrschrift für
Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, lxxxviii (), -.
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fiscal policies and economic ‘nationalism’ known as bullionism:1 the
ban on the export of gold and silver bullion and the demand that it be
taken to the state’s mint for coinage, at the merchant’s cost, part of
which constituted the mint’s profit. Anyone who violated such ordin-
ances faced the risk of confiscation and a steep fine; and while some
could purchase exemptions, they still incurred higher export costs.
Debasements, which reduced the precious metal contents of silver
and gold coins, fuelled the bullionist mentality and further impeded
the international flow of precious metals. Philip IV of France, after a
century of monetary stability, resumed the practice in , primarily
to finance his wars with Flanders and England, and he thereby inaug-
urated two hundred years of guerres monétaires throughout western
Europe.2 Medieval debasements were more fiscal than monetary in
nature, because most were designed to increase the mint’s coinage out-
put and thus its seigniorage revenues: a tax on the quantity of precious
metals coined. To achieve this objective, the mint offered merchants,
in exchange for their bullion (in coin or ingots), a quantity of debased
coin whose official (‘face’) value was greater than the official value of
the better-quality coins delivered to the mint, or greater than the value
that foreign mints offered in purchasing bullion. So long as the mer-
chants quickly spent their debased coins, before the almost inevitable
inflation ensued, they also profited from debasements. A variation of
this monetary policy was to counterfeit better coins minted in neigh-
bouring states: that is, to produce imitations that contained a lesser
quantity of precious metal. Therefore, to protect their own mints and
their coinage supplies, most princes or states responded to foreign
debasements by prohibiting the import of foreign coins for domestic
circulation, requiring their sale to the state’s mint as bullion, banning
the export of bullion – and often, also, by engaging in their own
debasements. Gresham’s law, which states that ‘bad money drives out
good’, explains the essence of debasements and mint policies in later
medieval western Europe.3
1 The best example of both bullionism and economic nationalism, expressing a virulent hostility to
many foreigners, ‘our cruell enmyes’, can be found in the fifteenth-century English tract The Libelle of
Englyshe Polycye: A Poem on the Use of Sea-Power, ed. G. F. Warner (Oxford, ), esp. pp. 
(quotation), -, -, -, .
2 See R. Cazelles, ‘Quelques reflexions à propos des mutations monétaires de la monnaie royale
française (-)’, Le moyen âge, lxxii (), -, and -; C. M. Cipolla, The Monetary
Policy of Fourteenth-Century Florence (Berkeley, ), pp. -, -; P. Spufford, Money and Its
Use in Medieval Europe (Cambridge, ), pp. -; and J. H. Munro, ‘Bullion Flows and
Monetary Contraction in Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries’, in Precious Metals in the
Later Medieval and Early Modern Worlds, ed. J. F. Richards (Durham, NC, ), pp. -.
3 See J. H. Munro, ‘Gresham’s Law’, in The Oxford Encyclopedia of Economic History, ed. J. Mokyr et
al. (New York, ), ii. -. If someone acquires two silver coins with the same face value and
purchasing power, but with different silver contents, he should spend the inferior coin and hoard or
export the superior coin. The Elizabethan financier Sir Thomas Gresham (-) was not respon-
sible for this famous law, which dates from the fourteenth century. Examples, in numerous late
medieval monetary ordinances from England, Flanders, and France, are cited or reproduced in J. H.
Munro, Wool, Cloth, and Gold: The Struggle for Bullion in Anglo-Burgundian Trade, - (Brussels
and Toronto, ), esp. pp. -, -, -, -, -. See also H. Van Werveke, ‘Currency
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The most rigorous bullionist legislation was implemented in medi-
eval England, with a significant if indirect influence on the origins of
negotiability. From the Statutum de Moneta Magnum of , the
import of all foreign coins – not just counterfeits – for domestic cir-
culation was prohibited, a ban that remained in force as late as the
sixteenth century.1 Similarly, Crown and parliament together banned
the export of silver bullion (including foreign silver coin) and plate
from December , the export of gold bullion from January ,
and finally, from January , the export of all bullion and all coins,
gold and silver, including legal tender English coins (except coins
exported under costly royal licences). Continuously re-enacted, the
 ban remained in force until .2 Other medieval western Euro-
pean states permitted the export of legal-tender coins and reserved
their bans for bullion, that is, demonetized precious metals, excluding
specified types of plate and jewellery.3
The benefit of employing bills of exchange to make international
payments without shipping bullion and specie over long distances,
thereby reducing both risks and high costs, was obvious to an Eliza-
bethan pamphleteer, known only as ‘Mr Tavernor’. In his tract on ‘the
insatiable vice of usury, and drye exchaunge’, written about , he
asserted that ‘marchauntes naturall exchaunge was first divised and
used by the trewe dealing marchauntes immediately after that princes
did inhibit the cariadge of gould and silver out of their Realmes’.4 Risks
were not eliminated entirely, because bullion and specie had to be sup-
plied when conducting trade with towns not equipped with bills-of-
exchange banking facilities, for example in eastern Europe, and when
settling trade deficits or other adverse payments balances.
Furthermore, the bill of exchange itself involved the risks of repudi-
ation or non-payment. Not being a bond or a notarized contract, the
bill had no standing in medieval law; and to enforce payment, when a
bill was dishonoured, was difficult. Third parties who accepted bills in
payment for other transactions were at even greater risk; even though
bills of exchange and letters obligatory (promissory notes) were often
assigned in payment to third parties, they had not yet become a negoti-
able means of payment, and they would not become fully negotiable in
western Europe until the s.
        
Manipulation in the Middle Ages: The Case of Louis de Male, Count of Flanders’, Transactions of the
Royal Historical Society, th ser., xxxi (), -.
1 Statutes of the Realm, i. . Earlier, in April , the Statute of Westminster ( Edwardi I, c. )
had banned the importation of all suspected counterfeit or other defective coins, requiring them to be
turned over and sold for their bullion contents to the office of the Royal Exchanger.
2 For an explanation of all these ordinances and statutes, see Munro, ‘Bullionism and the Bill of
Exchange’, pp. -, - (tables, with a chronological list).
3 On this see Munro, Wool, Cloth, and Gold, pp. -, -; J. H. Munro, ‘Billon – Billoen – Billio:
From Bullion to Base Coinage’, Belgisch tijdschrift voor filologie en geschiedenis/ Revue belge de philologie
et d’histoire, lii (), -.
4 Tudor Economic Documents, ed. R. Tawney and E. Power (London, ), iii.  (doc. no. III.).
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As Eric Kerridge rightly states, ‘assignability is not negotiability.’1 A
fully negotiable instrument of credit must be made payable to bearer or
payable to order, permitting transfer by written endorsement to a third
party without the consent or knowledge of the original debtor (the
principal); the bearer or assigned holder must have the legal right,
upon default, to sue the original debtor or earlier assignees, in his own
name, for full payment, and to enforce a legal claim for damages; and
his legal claim must supersede anyone else’s named in the bill.
Schnapper contends that French rentes were not negotiable credit
instruments during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries because
they lacked a bearer or order clause.2 Similarly, Kirshner denies that
Florentine crediti di monte were negotiable, by modern definitions, even
though transferable by assignment (by cessio juris), by the seller himself
or by his attorneys, at the monte’s offices.3 The transfer carried with it
the liabilities attached to the original owner or creditor. Kirshner com-
ments that the modern ‘holder-in-due-course’ doctrine, by which the
transferee gains rights superior to the transferor’s, ‘would have scan-
dalized Florentine jurists’; that such commercial operations ‘never
replaced the Roman technique of assignment that was critical to the
operations of the secondary market in monte credits’. Lastly, the
Florentine government controlled the circulation of crediti di monte ‘by
barring foreigners from acquiring or otherwise holding them’ (except
during the crisis of the s).4
For fifteenth-century Genoa, Jacques Heers notes that shares in the
public debt (luoghi ) were traded, sold, mortgaged, and used as col-
lateral, as in Florence. They could be transferred by verbal or written
order at the office of the procurator, provided that the head of the
family holding the luoghi had not specified in writing that they were not
to be (alienare aut vendere, a common prohibition designed to protect
their viability as security for dowries). Finally, although foreign mer-
chants are recorded as purchasers of luoghi, most of them seem to have
been residents: Tuscans, Venetians, and Catalans were conspicuous by
their absence from the compere registers.5
* * * * *
1 See E. Kerridge, Trade and Banking in Early Modern England (Manchester, ), p. . See also:
M. Postan, ‘Credit in Medieval Trade’, Economic History Review, st ser., i (), -; M.
Postan, ‘Private Financial Instruments in Medieval England’, Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirt-
schaftsgeschichte, xxiii (), -; F. Beutel, ‘The Development of Negotiable Instruments in Early
English Law’, Harvard Law Review, li (), -; J. M. Holden, The History of Negotiable
Instruments in English Law (London, ), pp. -.
2 Schnapper, Les rentes au XIVe siècle, pp. -.
3 J. Kirshner, ‘Encumbering Private Claims to Public Debt in Renaissance Florence’, in The Growth
of the Bank as Institution and the Development of Money-Business Law, ed. V. Piergiovanni (Berlin,
), pp. - (quotations from pp. , ).
4 Kirshner, ‘Encumbering Private Claims’, pp. , , respectively; see also Molho, Florentine Public
Finances, pp. -.
5 Heers, Gênes au XVe siècle, pp. -, -, -.
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The first major step, though only a step, towards modern negotiability
took place in supposedly backward fifteenth-century England: in the
verdict of a London law court () concerning the transfer of a
‘bearer’ bill of exchange. Strongly influencing the verdict were English
mercantile practices and related legal institutions that developed from
the thirteenth century in response to a third set of financial impedi-
ments: those that the Crown imposed upon money-changing and thus
deposit banking. As Raymond Bogaert contends, deposit banking with
lending developed in Greece during the early fourth century  from
the activities of professional money-changers, known as trapezites and
goldsmiths, known as argyropatês (L. argentarius), who exchanged
‘foreign’ for domestic coins. The transition from money-changer and
coin dealer to banker is well known. Because money-changers and
goldsmiths had to be able to safeguard their valuable inventories, many
also offered the additional service of safeguarding the moneys, precious
metals, and valuables of their mercantile clients. They soon learned
that, by maintaining a sufficiently high reserve ratio (usually a third),
they could safely lend out the remainder, in short-term interest-bearing
loans. They could also allow clients who maintained deposit accounts
to make transfer payments, on verbal or by written instructions. By the
third century , Athenian bankers routinely provided giro transfers,
written orders of payment, and, in effect, cheques (documented by 
).1 Such explanations for the role of money-changers in the origins
of medieval Italian deposit and transfer banking are familiar from the
works of de Roover, confirmed recently by Reinhold Mueller and Van
der Wee.2 From the mid-twelfth century in northern Italy – in Genoa,
and then in Lombard towns – money-changers were serving as private
bankers, in the same fashion, even if they had to obtain government
licences to practise their trade in exchanging foreign for domestic coins
and in selling bullion to the mints.3 Medieval debasements and fre-
quent scarcities of coinage promoted the growth of deposit banking in
Italy, because bank-transfer payments – moneta di banco, to the Italians
– economized on the use of coin and provided a better guarantee of
full payment, when so many coins were debased, counterfeit, or
clipped. By , deposit and transfer banking can also be found in
Flanders, at Lille; and if Italians then predominated, indigenous Flem-
ish money-changer-bankers had become prominent by the s.4
1 R. Bogaert, ‘Banking in the Ancient World’, in A History of European Banking, nd ed., ed. H. Van
der Wee and G. Kurgan-Van Hentenrijk (Antwerp, ), pp. -.
2 See de Roover, Medici Bank, pp. -; de Roover, Money, Credit, and Banking in Mediaeval
Bruges, pp. -, -; Van der Wee, ‘European Banking’, pp. -; R. Mueller, ‘The Role of
Bank Money in Venice, -’, Studi Veneziani, new series, iii (), -; Mueller, Venetian
Money Market, pp. -.
3 On deposit banking and usury, see Noonan, Scholastic Analysis of Usury, pp. -; de Roover,
Medici Bank, pp. -.
4 See de Roover, Money, Credit, and Banking in Mediaeval Bruges, pp. -; Van der Wee, ‘Euro-
pean Banking’, pp. -; and J. M. Murray, ‘Cloth, Banking, and Finance in Medieval Bruges’, in
Textiles of the Low Countries in European Economic History, ed. E. Aerts and J. H. Munro (Leuven,
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In England, however, from , and probably earlier, money-
changing and trade in bullion was a strictly enforced royal monopoly
exercised by the Royal Exchanger. To enforce the bullionist statutes,
he posted officials in every town, authorized with the aid of the sheriff
to suppress private trade in precious metals, to purchase or confiscate
foreign coins, and to deliver them to the Tower of London mint for
recoinage. So long as the royal monopoly remained in force, until the
s, England lacked private deposit banking in the form available in
Italy, and also in medieval Flanders, at least until the early fifteenth
century.1
That such restrictions over coinage had adverse effects on private
deposit banking, even in the economically advanced Low Countries,
can be shown in the monetary policies of duke Philip the Good of Bur-
gundy (r. -) after he unified their coinages in -.2 Fearing
that money-changers acting as deposit bankers threatened the integrity
of the ducal mints and coins, by circulating debased and counterfeit
foreign coins and buying coin and bullion for export, Philip and his
successors repeatedly prohibited deposit and transfer banking: in ,
, , and .3 The prohibitions also revealed a fear of
bankers; for in  Philip declared it unlawful for anyone ‘whether a
money-changer or not, to have a bank in order to receive the money of
merchants and to make their payments, under the penalty of banish-
ment for three years’.4 Similarly, the prohibition of  contended
that frequent bank ‘failures have wrought utter ruin among all classes
of people, but especially among the merchants.’5 According to Van der
Wee, ‘the few deposit and clearing-banks once operating in Antwerp
and Bergen-op-Zoom had disappeared before the end of the [fifteenth]
century.’ Effective banking re-emerged only slowly in the Low Coun-
tries, in late sixteenth-century Antwerp and seventeenth-century Am-
sterdam, with the kassiers, or ‘cash-keepers’, who ‘combined manual
exchange with deposit banking’.6
Even if the royal exchangers prevented the emergence of English
deposit banking before the mid-seventeenth century – a contentious
hypothesis – indigenous merchant-banking, with bills of exchange and
        
), pp. -; E. Aerts, ‘Money and Credit: Bruges as a Financial Centre’, in Bruges and Europe,
ed. V. Vermeersch (Antwerp, ), pp. -.
1 See Annals of the Coinage of Great Britain and Its Dependencies: From the Earliest Period of Authentic
History to the Reign of Victoria, ed. R. Ruding (London, ), ii. -.
2 See P. Spufford, Monetary Problems and Policies in the Burgundian Netherlands, - (Leiden,
), pp. -, -, -, -; Munro, Wool, Cloth, and Gold, pp. -.
3 De Roover, Money, Banking, and Credit in Mediaeval Bruges, pp. -, -. See also H. Van
der Wee, The Growth of the Antwerp Market and the European Economy, Fourteenth-Sixteenth Centuries
(The Hague, ), ii. -, -, -; Van der Wee, ‘Monetary, Credit, and Banking Systems’,
pp. , , -, -.
4 De Roover, Money, Banking, and Credit in Mediaeval Bruges, p.  n. .
5 Ibid., pp. -.
6 See Van der Wee, ‘Monetary, Credit, and Banking Systems’, pp. -; for a similar verdict, see de
Roover, Money, Banking, and Credit in Mediaeval Bruges, pp. -, .
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letters obligatory, had been available since at least the mid-fourteenth
century;1 and in the late sixteenth century, rudimentary forms of bank-
lending were undertaken by merchants, brokers, scriveners (notaries
public who drew up letters obligatory and bonds), and goldsmiths. As
members of a guild of jewellers chartered in , who also acted as
illicit dealers in precious metals, goldsmiths were the most logical of
the group to become bankers.2 But, according to A. D. Richards, until
the s, their banking activities were the least prominent of the four,
and the scriveners were the most important.3 As late as , the
Crown was prosecuting London goldsmiths for illegally ‘acting as ex-
changers and buying and selling bullion, selecting the best money and
melting it down [for export]’.4
The breakdown of royal authority during the Civil War of the s,
when, furthermore, a desperate Charles I (r. -) confiscated bul-
lion that merchants had left on deposit with London’s Tower Mint,
may have been the key factor in the transformation of London’s gold-
smiths into fully fledged bankers, certainly after the Restoration and
accession of Charles II (r. -). By the s, they were actively
engaged in both deposit and transfer and bills banking, including dis-
counting, using four forms of negotiable credit: cheques, promissory
notes, bills of exchange, and their own banknotes.5
In the medieval era, the lack of Italian-style deposit banks had not
prevented English merchants from making transfer payments, but it
had spurred them to devise other ways of meeting their need for a
negotiable credit instrument, albeit unsuccessfully until the mid-
fifteenth century. The first, which dates to the late twelfth century, was
to effect ‘coinless payments’ through assignable or transferable bills
that passed from hand to hand, increasingly in the form of informal
holographs.6
The use of such transferable bills or credit notes posed an obvious
problem not easily resolved: namely, that third parties receiving such
bills had no readily available, low-cost means of enforcing payment in
cases of default. English merchants had the means of transferring
1 See Postan, ‘Financial Instruments’, pp. -; and more specific evidence in J. H. Munro, ‘English
“Backwardness” and Financial Innovations in Commerce with the Low Countries, th to th
Centuries’, in International Trade in the Low Countries (th-th Centuries): Merchants, Organisation,
Infrastructure, ed. P. Stabel, B. Blondé, and A. Greve (Leuven, ), pp. -.
2 See R. D. Richards, The Early History of Banking in England (London, ; reissued ), pp. -
, -; Van der Wee, ‘European Banking’, pp. -; and J. R. Anonymous, ‘The Goldsmith
Bankers’, in Money and Banking in England: The Development of the Banking System, -, ed.
B. L. Anderson and P. L. Cottrell (London, ), pp. -.
3 Richards, Early History of Banking, pp. -.
4 A Bibliography of Royal Proclamations of the Tudor and Stuart Sovereigns, -, ed. R. Steele and
J. Lindsay (Earl of Crawford) (London, ), i.  (no. :  May ).
5 Richards, Early History of Banking, pp. -; D. Coquillette, ‘The Mystery of the New Fashioned
Goldsmiths: From Usury to the Bank of England (-)’, in The Growth of the Bank as Institution
and the Development of Money-Business Law, ed. V. Piergiovanni (Berlin, ), pp. -.
6 See Postan, ‘Credit in Medieval Trade’, pp. -; Postan, ‘Private Financial Instruments in Medi-
eval England’, pp. -; Munro, ‘English “Backwardness” and Financial Innovations’, pp. -.
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formal, notarized debts: in particular those known as ‘recognizances’
(reconisaunce enroulee) that had been registered in the rolls of a mayor’s
court, according to the provisions of the statute Acton Burnell of 
(Statutum de Mercatoribus), which gave creditors the power to compel
debtors to register their loans as bonds before the mayors of London,
York, Bristol, other ‘good towns’, and fair courts.1 Such assignments of
debt, however, obliged the two parties to draw up a new notarized,
sealed, and enrolled recognizance at considerable cost. If the original
debtor subsequently defaulted, the third-party creditor could file suit
in a common law court only if armed with a notarized, unrevoked
power of attorney to justify his claim. Even then, success was bought at
considerable cost in time – long delays were common – and money.
According to Michael Postan, later medieval English common law
courts became ‘increasingly hostile’ to the assignment of such debts.
They recognized the validity only of debt transfers that involved ‘a
common interest’ between assignor and assignee, generally limited to
assignments that satisfied ‘a pre-existing debt’ between them.2 There-
fore, Postan implicitly argues, rising transaction costs as well as rising
legal costs forced most merchants to resort to such low-cost holo-
graphs as the letter obligatory (promissory note) and the bill of ex-
change, both of them without standing in common law courts.3
During the later Middle Ages, however, a legal alternative to the
common law for commercial transactions slowly evolved: an inter-
national code known as law merchant, as expounded in the treatise Lex
Mercatoria (c.). According to J. H. Baker, law merchant was ‘not
so much a corpus of mercantile practice or commercial law as an
expeditious procedure especially adapted for the needs of men who
could not tarry for the common law’. It differed from common law in
being speedier, with lower transaction costs, especially in forgoing the
time-consuming common-law practice of ‘wager of law’, a compurga-
tion by which eleven witnesses were required to swear a formal oath to
deny a specific debt obligation.4 In , Edward I established a law-
merchant court in London composed of foreign merchants empowered
to settle their own commercial disputes. In , in issuing Carta
Mercatoria to regulate relations with the Hanse and other foreign mer-
chants, he stipulated that all merchants were entitled to receive ‘speedy
1 Statutes of the Realm, i. - ( Edwardi I:  Oct. ).
2 See Postan, ‘Financial Instruments’, pp. -, esp. pp. -; Holden, Negotiable Instruments, pp.
-; W. S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law (London, -), v. -.
3 See Postan, ‘Financial Instruments’, pp. -, contending that ‘common law courts made the
emergence of fully negotiable paper impossible,’ so that ‘the transfer of obligations was fraught with
cumbersome formalities’ (p. ). See P. Nightingale, ‘Monetary Contraction and Mercantile Credit
in Later Medieval England’, Economic History Review, nd ser., xlii (), -, contending that
recognizances continued to play an important, if diminishing role, in later medieval English commer-
cial and financial transactions.
4 J. H. Baker, ‘The Law Merchant and the Common Law before ’, Cambridge Law Journal,
xxxviii (), -; and P. Teetor, ‘England’s Earliest Treatise on the Law Merchant’, American
Journal of Legal History, vi (), -.
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justice’ by law merchant (sine dilatione, secundum legem mercatoriam);
and that, in a dispute between foreign and domestic merchants, half of
the jury should consist of foreigners.1 Finally, in , Edward III (r.
-) incorporated law merchant into statutory law in parliament’s
Ordinance of the Staples. The ordinance established fifteen Staple
Courts, in English ports, to settle disputes among merchants, both
domestic and foreign, who traded there; and it stipulated that they
were to function solely ‘by the Law Merchant … and not by the Com-
mon Law of the Land’, without interference from royal justices or
other legal officers.2 That medieval England was the first principality to
produce such mercantile legislation is less remarkable than it may
seem, for no medieval princes were so dependent on the taxation of
foreign trade for their incomes as were the first three Edwards.
As the role of staple or law-merchant courts in handling disputes
over bills of exchange and other credit instruments is well known, only
the culminating legal case related to issues of negotiability need be
considered here: Burton v Davy, adjudicated by the mayor of London’s
law-merchant court between August and November .3 The dis-
pute concerned a disputed bearer bill of exchange, and its underlying
debt, drawn in Bruges on  December , for redemption in Lon-
don on  March . In Bruges, the two principals were Thomas
Hanworth, the ‘deliverer’, and John Audley, the ‘taker’, who had
received from Hanworth funds in Flemish pounds groot for the pur-
chase of Flemish merchandise. Their two agents in London were Elias
Davy, the payer, on whom Audley had drawn the bill for payment for
£ sterling; and John Burton, the payee designated by Hanworth.
The fifth party was John Walden, the ‘bearer’ to whom Burton had
transferred the bill. When Davy refused to redeem the bill on its
maturity, Walden brought the suit before the mayor’s court on 
August , ‘with a supplication made in the name of the aforemen-
tioned John Burton, according to the Law Merchant’.4 Since English
law-merchant courts had not yet established a precedent to give the
‘bearer’ of a bill independent legal standing, Walden had to ask Burton
to act as the nominal plaintiff against Davy; but Burton, apart from
1 N. S. B. Gras, The Early English Customs System: A Documentary Study of the Institutional and
Economic History of the Customs from the Thirteenth to the Sixteenth Century (Cambridge, MA, ),
pp. -; Munimenta Gildhallae Londoniensis: Liber Albus, Liber Custumarum et Liber Horn, ed. H. T.
Riley (London, -), II. i: Liber Custumarum, pp. -; and Foedera, conventiones, literae, et acta
publica, ed. T. Rymer (London, -), II. ii. - (reconfirmation by Edwardi II,  Aug. ).
2  Edwardi III stat. , in Statutes of the Realm , i. -.
3 See Postan, ‘Private Financial Instruments’, pp. -; Nightingale, ‘Monetary Contraction and
Mercantile Credit’, pp. -; J. H. Munro, ‘The International Law Merchant and the Evolution of
Negotiable Credit in Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries’, in Banchi pubblici, banchi
privati e monti di pietà nell’Europa preindustriale: Amministrazione, tecniche operative e ruoli economici, ed.
D. Puncuh and G. Felloni (Genoa, ), i. -; Munro, ‘English “Backwardness” and Financial
Innovations’, pp. -.
4 For the texts of this case, see Select Cases Concerning the Law Merchant, ed. H. Hall (London, -
), iii: - (Latin and French, with English translations).
 John H. Munro
supplying testimony, played no further role in the suit. Burton, as the
designated payee, was obligated by commercial custom to present the
bill to Davy for acceptance, as soon as possible after receiving it from
Bruges, and certainly well before ‘usance’, or its maturity. If Davy had
never formally ‘accepted’ the bill, Burton could never have legitimately
transferred it to Walden, who similarly would never have agreed to
receive it. Furthermore, if Davy had refused to accept the bill, Burton
could not have been the plaintiff, according to the medieval custom.
Instead, as the deliverer’s payee-agent, he would have immediately –
well before the maturity date – informed his principal, Thomas Han-
worth, who, as the deliverer, would have taken legal action against the
other principal, the taker and drawer of the bill, John Audley. Finally,
if Davy had accepted the bill, but then refused to redeem it, and if
Walden, as the ‘bearer’, had been merely a collection agent for Burton,
Burton’s lawsuit would not have involved Walden. Walden’s legal role
can be explained only by the fact that as the ‘bearer’ holding the bill on
maturity, he was its current owner, and was rebuffed on submitting it
for redemption.1
The mayor, John Mitchell, after hearing the witnesses and ruling
that the case fell under the jurisdiction of his court and not the com-
mon law courts, issued his verdict in favour of the supplicant, without
actually naming him, and also of ‘John Walden, the bearer of the same
letter [of exchange]’, who ‘is held, reputed, and admitted in place of
the said supplicant, according to the Law Merchant’. Davy was re-
quired to pay the full amount of the bill plus s. in damages,
‘according to the Law Merchant and the custom aforesaid … and to
the force, form, and effect of the said letter’.
Although this verdict was not binding on English courts, did not in-
spire any royal legislation, and did not establish any legal conditions
for modern negotiability, it did provide a vital precedent to allow the
bearer of a dishonoured bill of exchange to sue, on its maturity, for
both payment and damages.2 None of the subsequent legal evidence
indicates that a bearer in similar circumstances required support from
the payee, as in Burton v Davy, to launch a suit against the acceptor
(payer), for payment and damages. English commercial records from
the later fifteenth century show that bearer bills had become common-
1 See J. S. Rogers, The Early History of the Law of Bills and Notes: A Study of the Origins of Anglo-
American Commercial Law (Cambridge, ), pp. xi-xiv, -, -, who presents these counter-
arguments to refute the significance of Burton v Davy. See further points in my rebuttal in Munro,
‘English “Backwardness” and Financial Innovations’, pp. -. For the legal procedures to be fol-
lowed with dishonoured or non-accepted bills, see de Roover, Lettre de change, pp. -; de Roover,
Medici Bank, p. ; and G. Malynes, Consuetudo vel Lex Mercatoria, or The Ancient Law Merchant
(London, ), republished in facsimile by Walter Johnson and Theatrum Orbis Terrarum (Amster-
dam, ), pp. -.
2 For an exaggerated claim that Burton v Davy did establish the conditions of modern negotiability,
see Beutal, ‘Negotiable Instruments’, p. ; and for a more modified view that Burton v Davy met at
least two of the conditions for modern negotiability, especially the ability of the person holding the
bill pro tempore to sue upon it, see Holden, Negotiable Instruments, pp. -.
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place.1 In -, Henry VIII (r. -) transferred jurisdiction over
most commercial cases from the Staple and mayors’ courts to the royal
Court of Admiralty; but, as James Rogers has shown, common law
courts were handling some cases that involved bills of exchange, or
their underlying debt obligations, from the s, with no apparent
conflicts with law-merchant procedures.2
* * * * *
The real importance of Burton v Davy was its indirect but substantial
influence on the first European state legislation to establish the judicial
conditions for modern negotiability: in three major ordinances passed
by the States General of the Habsburg Netherlands, between  and
. The route, however, was circuitous, possibly by way of Lübeck,
the hub of the Hanseatic League, whose merchants traded extensively
with London, Bruges, and Antwerp. In May , Lübeck’s law-mer-
chant court rendered a verdict concerning the rights of the bearer in a
disputed bill in a case virtually identical to Burton v Davy; and in
March , it confirmed the verdict.3 Five years later, in , a law-
merchant court in Antwerp, after hearing a case involving a dis-
honoured bearer bill, known as letter obligatory, issued a turba or judge-
ment that, in Van der Wee’s words, ‘granted the bearer of writings
obligatory the same rights as the original creditor [payee] with regard
to the prosecution of an insolvent debtor’. Previously, Antwerp mer-
chants seeking to enforce payments on debts assigned to third parties
had been obliged, in their lawsuits, ‘to obtain an explicit authority
from the original creditor’, revocable at any time.4 The text, however,
does not indicate that the bearer had superior rights, over those of the
payee, in suing for payment, a ‘holder in due-course’ condition for
modern negotiability; and of course the same observation may be made
about Burton v Davy. If the London verdict was not cited as a pre-
cedent in the Antwerp court, the plaintiff, an English cloth merchant,
should have been familiar with its provisions. The English cloth trade,
it should be noted, had played by far the most crucial role in the rise of
the Antwerp market in the fifteenth century; and by the early sixteenth
century, Antwerp (-) was receiving about  per cent of all
1 See esp. A. Hanham, The Celys and Their World: An English Merchant Family of the Fifteenth Century
(Cambridge, ), pp. -: with bills or drafts drawn on the Bruges wisselaers (money-changers)
Collard De May and John Newenton, in -; and various documents in The Cely Letters, -,
ed. A. Hanham (London, ).
2 See Select Pleas in the Court of Admiralty, ed. R. Marsden (London, -), i. lvii, - (doc. ),
- (doc. ); and ii. , ; Beutel, ‘Negotiable Instruments’, pp. -; Rogers, Early History of
the Law of Bills, pp. -.
3 See P. Jeannin, ‘De l’arithmétique commerciale à la pratique bancaire: l’escompte aux XVIe-XVIIe
siècles’, in Puncuh and Felloni, Banchi pubblici, banchi privati, i. -, and M. North, ‘Banking and
Credit in Northern Germany in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries’, in ibid., ii. -.
4 Quotations from Van der Wee, ‘Money, Credit, and Banking Systems’, p. . See also H. Van der
Wee, ‘Anvers et les innovations de la technique financière aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles’, Annales:
Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations, xxii (), -.
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English woollen exports.1 The current restrictions on deposit and
transfer banking in the Netherlands made a legal decision on negoti-
able transfers welcome in this international mercantile community.
Subsequently, in  in Flanders, the municipal court of Bruges
rendered an almost identical decision: stating that ‘the bearer had all
the rights of a principal’ in suing defaulting debtors to claim payment
on commercial bills.2 A decade later, on  March , the States
General codified the decisions in legislation, and then produced a sup-
plementary law on  October . Unlike the legal precedents, the
legislation enabled the bearer to sue not only the original debtor but
also every prior assignor of the note for the full payment (including the
payee), and to take advantage of judicial procedures to enforce such
payments throughout the Netherlands. The legislation meant that all
commercial paper, whether made out to bearer or transferred by writ-
ten assignment, was fully negotiable and convertible into other assets,
without the costly participation or even knowledge of the original prin-
cipals. In other words, merchants were now able to achieve full liquid-
ity – exchanging paper credit assets for cash or bank deposits – without
having to pay a significant premium in doing so.3
In , the States General enacted another law that had an equal
importance in the establishment of modern negotiability: an amend-
ment of the usury legislation to permit interest payments of up to 
per cent per annum on all debts and commercial bills, and thus to
restrict the term usury to mean interest payments in excess of this
limit.4 In England, Henry VIII’s parliament enacted similar legislation
in , though with a limit of  per cent. After Edward VI’s parlia-
ment repealed the statute in , ‘forasmuche as Usurie is by the
worde of God utterly prohibited, as a vyce moste odyous and de-
testable’,5 Elizabeth I’s parliament restored it in .6
This legislation had great significance for the history of modern
financial institutions. Effective financial negotiability requires the dis-
counting of credit instruments. Anyone selling or transferring a finan-
cial claim, whether in a bill of exchange or in a promissory note, before
the stipulated date of maturity, has to accept a lesser payment than the
1 See Van der Wee, Antwerp Market, ii. -, -, -, -, -, -; Munro, ‘English
“Backwardness” and Financial Innovations’, pp. -, -.
2 Usher, Early History of Deposit Banking, pp. -.
3 For the text, see Recueil des ordonnances des Pays Bas, deuxième série, -, ed. C. Laurent, M. J.
Lameere, and H. Simont (Brussels, ), iv. -, -, . See analyses in Van der Wee, Antwerp
Market, ii. -; Van der Wee, ‘Money, Credit, and Banking Systems’, pp. -.
4 Van der Wee, Growth of the Antwerp Market, ii. : the ordinance was accompanied by an imperial
edict of Charles V.
5 Statute  Henrici VIII, c.  () and Statute - Edwardi VI c. , in Statutes of the Realm, iii.
; iv: . .
6  Elizabeth I, c.  (), in Statutes of the Realm, iv: . . Subsequently, with a gradual fall in the
real rate of interest, the ‘usury ceiling’ was lowered to  per cent in , to  per cent in , and
finally to  per cent in , remaining at that low level until : Richards, Early History of Banking
in England, pp. -.
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face value, to compensate for the interest forgone between the date of
sale and maturity. To discount bills openly would previously have ren-
dered the seller of the note subject to prosecution for usury, and would
have rendered the transaction unenforceable at law. Van der Wee, who
discovered the first documented example of discounting in Europe,
dated , in an English merchant’s letter obligatory drawn on the
Antwerp market, demonstrates that discounting evolved more slowly
than might have been expected. It became widespread only after
formal written assignments by endorsement on the back of bills be-
came customary in the late sixteenth century. According to Van der
Wee, endorsements brought the ‘definitive solution’, for they ‘excluded
any arguments about the identification of the assigning debtor’ and
thereby ensured that ‘liability was no longer limited to the latter, but
extended to all previous endorsers’; and, furthermore, many preferred
endorsed bills to bearer bills, because the latter could readily fall into
the wrong hands, through loss or theft, and be cashed.1
In , Antwerp’s magistrates published an official compilation of
commercial customs, known as the Costuymen, which included all the
provisions on negotiability, endorsement, and discount that had
developed in the Netherlands over the sixteenth century.2 That influ-
enced the composition of the even more famous treatise Consuetudo vel
Lex Mercatoria, or The Ancient Law Merchant, which Gerard Malynes
published in London, in . In describing the commerce of the Mer-
chants Adventurers in Antwerp, Amsterdam, and Hamburg, he states
that they may use a bearer bill to ‘buy other commodities therewith, as
if it were with readie money, the time onely considered’; or, if a
merchant ‘will have readie money for these Bills, he may sell them to
other merchants that are moneyed men, and abating for the interest for
the time, and … according to the rate, as they can agree’. In England,
however, ‘this laudable custome [of discounting] is not practised’.3
Surprisingly, Malynes mentions endorsement only obliquely, a subject
that the English writer John Marius treats in great detail, along with
discounting and other aspects of negotiability, in his  treatise on
Advice Concerning Bills of Exchange, which also analyses the use of ‘in-
land bills’ between English cities. According to Holden, many of
Marius’s commentaries were applied in common law proceedings.4 In
, the chief justice, Sir Edward Coke, had declared that the law
merchant ‘is part of the lawes of this realme’.5 Holden also contends
1 Quotation in Van der Wee, ‘Antwerp Market’, ii. , and p. , for the discounted English bill
(Kitson papers); see also pp. -; Van der Wee, ‘European Banking’, pp. -.
2 Van der Wee, ‘Monetary, Credit, and Banking Systems’, pp. -.
3 Malynes, Lex Mercatoria, p. . See also Van der Wee, ‘European Banking’, pp. -, -.
4 See Malynes, Lex Mercatoria, p. , concerning assignments of ‘Billes Obligatorie’, when ‘the law-
full assignee shall bee of Record, and registered also upon the Bill’. See also, Holden, Negotiable
Instruments, pp. -, -; Richards, Early History of Banking, pp. -, esp. p.  n. , citing Chief
Justice Sir John Holt’s comment in Ward v Evans () that Marius’s Advice is ‘a very good book’.
5 Kerridge, Trade and Banking, p. .
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that Coke’s successors transferred more and more jurisdiction over
commercial cases from the admiralty to common law courts; but, as
noted earlier, common law courts had handled several such cases from
the s. In rendering its verdict on Woodward v Rowe, in , the
court repeated Coke’s dictum, in declaring that all endorsed and
bearer bills of exchange were fully ‘transferable within the custome of
merchants’ and that ‘the custome is good enough generally for any
man, without naming him merchant’; in , the court ruled in
Williams v Williams that explicit details of law merchant did not have to
be provided, because ‘it is sufficient to say that such a person secundum
usum et consuetudinem mercatorum drew the bill.’1
Such evidence would seem to refute the commonplace notion that
England did not establish the legal conditions for negotiability until the
beginning of the eighteenth century. This view is, however, partially
true, insofar as it concerns both statute law and letters obligatory, more
commonly known, in the seventeenth century, as promissory notes.
Though some judges were willing to treat them in the same fashion as
bills of exchange, many were not. On three occasions – in , ,
and  – the house of lords refused assent to bills that would have
made promissory notes fully negotiable by endorsement.2 The reasons
may be understood in verdicts that the chief justice, Sir John Holt,
rendered, in  and , in two cases involving promissory notes.
He contended that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that these notes
were commercial, so that they might be treated ‘within the custom of
merchants’. As Rogers comments, although ‘Holt’s decisions were
entirely understandable, they obviously were not well received’.3 In
, parliament repudiated his verdicts in the Promissory Notes Act:
to make all such notes and bills fully negotiable, whether to bearer or
to order by endorsement, ‘according to the custom of merchants, as is
now used upon Bills of Exchange’.4 Burton v Davy, one should
remember, had concerned only bills of exchange.
* * * * *
When this issue of negotiability was resolved in English law, what
became the British financial revolution had already begun, though it
would not be complete for over half a century. If England ‘had no
system of long-term borrowing to match those of its neighbours’,
1 Quotations from Holden, Negotiable Instruments, pp. , ; see also pp. -; Rogers, Early History
of the Law of Bills, pp. -.
2 Holden, Negotiable Instruments, pp. -.
3 Quotations in Rogers, Early History of the Law of Bills, pp. -. See Malynes, Lex Mercatoria, p.
: ‘The Civile Law, and the Law Merchant, do require that the Bill shall declare for what the debt
groweth, either for Merchandize, or for Money, or any other lawfull consideration.’
4 ‘An Act for Giving Like Remedy Upon Promissory Notes as is Now Used Upon Bills of Exchange.’
 &  Anne c.  (), in Statutes of the Realm, viii. -. See also, Holden, Negotiable Instruments,
pp. -, -; Rogers, Early History of the Law of Bills , pp. -.
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should one attribute the revolution to the accession of the Dutch
prince of Orange, as king William III (William and Mary), after the
better-known Glorious Revolution of -?1 Despite the long-
standing connections between the two countries, the United Provinces
had not provided a model until it won its independence from Spain in
. The exigencies of war had forced the republican government to
resume the compulsory purchase of renten, while frequently suspending
annuity payments, practices that ceased after  and were not
resumed with the resumption of war in , when losrenten were sold
at the traditional rate of . per cent, and lijfrenten at . per cent. By
, interest rates had been reduced to  per cent and, according to
Hart, the United Provinces could ‘borrow more cheaply than any other
government – except perhaps certain city states – on bonds that were
bought on a voluntary basis’, and which were ‘held by a large group of
domestic investors’.2 Many English observers were praising the Dutch
financial system as the one to emulate.
There are two significant features in seventeenth-century Dutch
public finances. The first was the vital importance of the Amsterdam
bourse as a secondary financial market for trade not only in Dutch
losrenten (and debentures called obligatiën) but also in other Euro-
pean rentes and public debt certificates.3 The second was the almost
complete shift to issues of losrenten after the grand pensionary, Johan
de Witt, applying an early form of probability theory, demonstrated in
 that the sale of lijfrenten without taking account of the age of the
designated nominee, especially if he was an infant, would be costly for
the government.4 De Witt’s calculation influenced the British decision,
from , to issue only perpetual but redeemable annuities, whereas
France’s public debt continued in the eighteenth century to be heav-
ily based on rentes viagères.5 Nevertheless, Hart, who warns against
1 Dickson, Financial Revolution, p. .
2 Hart, ‘The Devil or the Dutch’, pp. -. For public debt in seventeenth-century Holland, see also
Tracy, Financial Revolution, pp. -; J. de Vries and A. van der Woude, The First Modern Econ-
omy: Success, Failure, and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, - (Cambridge, ), pp. -;
J. Riley, International Government Finance and the Amsterdam Capital Market, - (Cambridge,
), pp. -; M. ’t Hart, ‘The Merits of a Financial Revolution: Public Finance, -’, in A
Financial History of the Netherlands, ed. M. ’t Hart, J. Junker, and J. Luiten van Zanden (Cambridge,
), pp. -; M. ’t Hart, ‘The United Provinces, -’, in Rise of the Fiscal State, ed.
Bonney, pp. -. See also W. Fritschy, ‘A “Financial Revolution” Revisited: Public Finance in
Holland during the Dutch Revolt, -’, Economic History Review, lvi (), -.
3 Riley, Amsterdam Capital Market, pp. -; V. Barbour, Capitalism in Amsterdam in the th
Century (Ann Arbor, ), pp. -; Ehrenberg, Capital and Finance, pp. -; L. Neal, The Rise of
Financial Capitalism: International Capital Markets in the Age of Reason (Cambridge, ), pp. -,
-, -, -; P. Dehing and M. ‘t Hart, ‘Linking the Fortunes: Currency and Banking, -
’, in Financial History of the Netherlands, ed. Hart, Junker, and van Zanden, pp. -; S. Homer
and R. Sylla, A History of Interest Rates, rd rev. ed. (New Brunswick, ), pp. -.
4 J. de Witt, Waerdije van lijfrenten naer proportie van losrenten (The Hague, ). He advocated that
lijfrenten be sold instead at . per cent (/), with higher rates for older buyers and lower rates for
children. See Riley, Amsterdam Capital Market, pp. -, .
5 See P. T. Hoffman, G. Postel-Vinay, and J.-L. Rosenthal, Priceless Markets: The Political Economy of
Credit in Paris, - (Chicago, ), p. ; D. Weir, ‘Tontines, Public Finance, and Revolution
in France and England, -’, Journal of Economic History, xlix (), -; F. Velde and D.
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exaggerating the Dutch influence on England’s financial revolution,
points out that the Bank of England made a major contribution,
whereas the Wisselbank van Amsterdam played no role in the Dutch
debt; and he also stresses that the Dutch debt, largely borne by Hol-
land, was provincial rather than national.1
Nor is there any evidence that William III exerted a personal influ-
ence over England’s financial revolution, other than burdening Eng-
land with the costs of his wars with Louis XIV (r. -), which
necessitated the establishment of a permanent funded debt. It began in
January  with the Million Pound Loan, which, apart from a  per
cent tontine provision, was a self-liquidating lifetime annuity, paying
the high rate of  per cent, funded by additional excise taxes on beer,
vinegar, cider, and brandy. Subsequent borrowing was also funded
from excise and customs duties. From  to , the directors of
the new Bank of England laid the true foundations for the financial
revolution by lending the government £. million, at the then attract-
ive rate of  per cent, in order to secure their monopoly on joint-stock
banking, raising the funds by selling Bank stock. Though redeemable
on one year’s notice from , the loan was in fact perpetual. In ,
the New East India Company made a similar  per cent perpetual loan
to secure its charter, as did the newly merged United East India Com-
pany in . From  to , the exchequer also issued irredeem-
able annuities, both ‘long annuities’ for  years (at between . and
. per cent) and ‘short annuities’ for  years (at . per cent), and,
from  to , a series of highly popular lottery loans. Meanwhile,
in , the newly formed South Sea Company bought up £.
million in short-term floating debts and converted them into so-called
perpetual stock with a  per cent return; and in , it converted
another £. million in other loans and annuities into  per cent
perpetual stock, a venture that led to its collapse in  in the famous
‘Bubble’. Thereafter, while redeeming £. million in South Sea stock
and annuities, the Bank of England, on behalf of the government,
issued several series of redeemable ‘stock’, many containing the popu-
lar lottery provisions, with generally lower rates of interest: . per cent
in , . per cent in , . per cent in -, . per cent in
, . per cent from  to , and . per cent from  to
.
Finally, between  and , the chancellor of the exchequer, Sir
Henry Pelham, began to convert all outstanding debt and annuity
issues – those not held by the Bank of England, the East India Com-
pany, and the reconstituted South Sea Company – into the Consoli-
dated Stock of the Nation, popularly known as Consols. Those holding
        
Weir, ‘The Financial Market and Government Debt Policy in France, -’, Journal of Economic
History, lii (), -; Homer and Sylla, Interest Rates, pp. -  (and table , p. ).
1 Hart, ‘The Devil or the Dutch’, pp. -.
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the new Consols, irredeemable until , received . per cent from
Christmas  and . per cent from Christmas , at which time
the . per cent South Sea Stock was also converted.1 Consols were
fully transferable and negotiable, marketed on both the London Stock
Exchange and the Amsterdam bourse; along with Bank of England and
East India Company stock, they were the major securities traded on
the London Stock Exchange in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries. Though Consols were both perpetual but redeemable an-
nuities, thus identical to Dutch losrenten, their instant and long-
enduring popular success was attributable to the firmly held belief,
abroad as well as at home, that the government would not exercise its
option to redeem them. In fact, these Consols were not called until
, when the chancellor of the exchequer, Sir Edward Goschen,
taking advantage of a sustained fall in interest rates, converted them
into . per cent Consols, with the provision that they be converted
into . per cent Consols in .2 Unchanged to this day, they con-
tinue to trade on the London Stock Exchange, with a value of £.
on  June , and thus a yield of . per cent (the coupon divided
by the market price).
The result of the financial revolution was a remarkably stable and
continuously effective form of public finance, which achieved an un-
precedented reduction in the costs of government borrowing: from 
per cent in  to  per cent in . Public finances based on rentes
had always been cheaper to maintain than interest-bearing loans, and
perpetual rentes cheaper than life rentes. Nor did perpetual rentes
permanently alienate the government’s revenues as long as the
government had the right to redeem them at par. Many European
governments issued rentes rather than bonds with stipulated redemp-
tion dates because they were relieved of the obligation to redeem their
debts and thus to refinance them. They could redeem them when
changes in interest rates made it advantageous to do so.
Despite the seemingly low yields, both the affluent and those of
modest means came to see rentes or annuities as an attractive invest-
ment, readily available and readily negotiable. That Consols, or rentes
in general, were more marketable, with lower transaction costs, may
explain why so many preferred holding them to higher interest-bearing
loans, bonds, or debentures. For that reason, Consols and other nego-
tiable annuities provided the most important form of collateral for
1 See Dickson, Financial Revolution in England, pp. -, -, -, -, -, -;
P. G. M. Dickson and J. Sperling, ‘War Finance, -’, in The New Cambridge Modern History:
VI: The Rise of Great Britain and Russia, -, ed. J. S. Bromley (Cambridge, ), pp. -;
E. V. Morgan and W. A. Thomas, The Stock Exchange: Its History and Functions (London, ), pp.
-; Neal, Rise of Financial Capitalism, pp. -.
2 See Dickson, Financial Revolution, pp. -; Morgan and Thomas, Stock Exchange, pp. -;  R.
Michie, The London Stock Exchange: A History (Oxford, ), pp. -; C. K. Harley, ‘Goschen’s
Conversion of the National Debt and the Yield on Consols’, Economic History Review, nd ser., xxix
(), -.
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short-term borrowing, especially for merchants and industrialists
during the Industrial Revolution, when bonds and debentures often
traded at high discounts. Some investors, with mixed portfolios, may
have found the fixed maturity dates of bonds and debentures attract-
ive, but not when interest rates were falling, as they were in the eight-
eenth century, and again in the later nineteenth century.1
These factors, along with others examined in this study, resolve an
apparent paradox: why, in early modern Europe, rates on long-term or
perpetual annuities were so much lower than short-term interest rates,
whereas the opposite is now true. Currently ( June ), the yield
on -day Canadian Treasury bills is . per cent; on -year Canada
bonds, . per cent; and on -year Canada bonds, . per cent. In
eighteenth-century Britain, the primary explanation for the low yields
on Consols may have been their exceptional value as business col-
lateral. Douglass North and Barry Weingast, however, after citing a
considerable number of forced loans that the Stuarts had exacted
during the seventeenth century, contend that the real reason for the
financial revolution’s success in achieving such low interest rates was
the Glorious Revolution: in particular, the new parliamentary govern-
ment’s success in eliminating both coercion in public borrowing and
defaults in debt payments.2 Conversely, as already noted earlier, the
predominant reason for such higher interest rates on short-term loans
or bonds elsewhere in Europe was the risk premium, with a far higher
probability of default than on rentes; and sometimes as well a premium
that investors required to comply with compulsory loans. A third rea-
son, valid even in England and the Netherlands to the very late seven-
teenth century, was the premium that a lender demanded to compen-
sate for the social stigma still attached to usury.
One might well contend, however, that the sixteenth-century Prot-
estant Reformations had made usury a dead letter in the Netherlands
and England, especially after the amendments to their usury legis-
lation; and many would thus maintain that the financial revolution, in
providing such manifest financial advantages, had nothing to do with
circumventing the usury problem. Certainly both major leaders of the
Reformation, Martin Luther (-) and John Calvin (-),
did reject the canon law on usury; but they considered interest pay-
ments to be licit only for investment loans, with a stipulated limit of 
per cent. Calvin stated that ‘it is a very rare thing for a man to be
honest and at the same time a usurer’ and recommended that all habit-
ual usurers be expelled from the church.3 Many of his followers, along
1 Long-term interest rates consistently had a downward trend. See Homer and Sylla, Interest Rates,
pp. -, especially table  (pp. -), and chart  (p. ).
2 D. North and B. Weingast, ‘Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutional Public
Choice in Seventeenth-Century England’, Journal of Economic History, xlix (), -.
3 G. Harkness, John Calvin: The Man and His Ethics (New York, ), p. ; R. Bainton, The
Reformation of the Sixteenth Century (Boston, ), pp. -.
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with Anabaptists and Lutherans, criticized usury as strongly as any
Catholic; an English Puritan divine later commented that ‘Calvin deals
with usurie as the apothecarie doth with poyson.’1 In Holland, the
Calvinist synod had decreed in  that no banker should ever be
allowed to take communion (bread and wine);2 and in England, as Sir
Richard Tawney remarks, the ‘soul-corrupting’ taint of usury remained
strong within the public’s memory, as ‘clerical conservatism continued
to repeat such [anti-usury] doctrines down to the eve of the Civil
War.’3 In , the Restoration parliament passed the ‘Act for the Re-
straining of Excessive Usury’ to reduce the limit on interest payments
from  to  per cent, contending that the higher rate had led to the
‘great discouragement of Ingenuity and industry … of this Nation’. It
prescribed triple forfeiture of the ‘value of the Moneys, Wares, and
Merchandize soe Lent’ above the new rate. Heading its list of pre-
sumed usurers were ‘Scrivenors and Scrivenor Brokers’, who, in
arranging loans for clients, were also subject to a fine of £ and six
months’ imprisonment for exacting a fee of more than s. per £
lent.4
Whether or not public opinion about usury and bankers had im-
proved by the s, the subsequent British ‘financial revolution’
marked the culmination of an institutional evolution in European pub-
lic finance that may be traced back, by way of the Netherlands, to the
financial innovations of thirteenth-century French and Flemish towns:
in their resort to rentes, as an attractive and morally acceptable alterna-
tive to interest-bearing loans, at a time when the Church was resusci-
tating its vigorous attack on usury. Thus, the responses to the pro-
hibition of usury promoted rather than retarded European economic
progress. The centuries-long evolution of the European financial revo-
lution provides another example of a socio-economic institution that,
as Joseph Schumpeter contends, is one ‘of a large group of surviving
features from earlier ages that play such an important part in every
concrete social situation’, and is thus ‘an element that stems from the
living conditions, not of the present, but of the past’, a form of histor-
ical path-dependency.5
The financial revolution also involved other important forms of
negotiable credit, particularly discountable exchequer bills, which the
Bank of England introduced in ; and governments of this and sub-
sequent eras also relied heavily upon negotiable bills of exchange in
1 Cited in R. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism: A Historical Study (London, ), p. ;
and Noonan, Scholastic Analysis of Usury, pp. -.
2 Parker, ‘Emergence of Modern Finance’, p. .
3 T. Wilson, A Discourse upon Usury by Way of Dialogue and Orations [], with an historical intro-
duction by R. H. Tawney (New York, ), pp. -, esp. p. ; Tawney, Religion and the Rise of
Capitalism, pp. -, -, -.
4 Statute  Charles II c. , in Statutes of the Realm, v. -. See also Richards, Early History of
Banking, p. ; Coquillette, ‘From Usury to the Bank of England’, pp. -.
5 J. Schumpeter, Imperialism and Social Classes: Two Essays (New York, ), p. .
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transmitting funds and effecting payments abroad. The origins of this
instrument of credit can also be traced to the thirteenth century, as a
means of circumventing not only the ban on usury but also political
impediments to bullion flows and international payments. England’s
important if limited contribution to the development of negotiability in
bills of exchange in the fifteenth century may be seen as a mercantile
response to state monetary restrictions that had prevented the develop-
ment of deposit banking. To this day, bills of exchange, though having
evolved from their medieval form into international ‘acceptances’,
remain crucial to international commerce and finance. Annuities,
however, have largely disappeared from European public finance, as
governments, during the twentieth century, reverted to short-term
loans and bonds.
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- . . . ,. . . ,.
- . . . ,. . . ,.
- . ,. ,. ,. . . ,.
- . ,. ,. ,. . . ,.
- . . . ,. . . ,.
- . . . ,. . . ,.
- . . . ,. . . ,.
- . ,. ,. ,. . . ,.
- . . . ,. . . ,.
- . ,. ,. ,. . . ,.
S: Algemeen Rijksarchief Brussel, Rekenkamer, registers nos. , () to , ().
T . Aalst Civic Revenues and Expenditures: The Role of Hereditary and Life-Rents (Erfelijk Renten and Lijfrenten) in






























-a ,. ,. ,. . . ,. .
- ,. ,. ,. . -. ,. .
- ,. ,. ,. . -. ,. .
- ,. ,. ,. . -. ,. .
- ,. ,. ,. . -. ,. .
- ,. ,. ,. . -. ,. .
- ,. ,. ,. . -. ,. .
- ,. ,. ,. . -. ,. .
- ,. ,. ,. ,. . -. ,. .
- ,. ,. ,. ,. . -,. ,. .
- ,. ,. ,. . -,. ,. .
- ,. ,. ,. . -. ,. .
- ,. ,. ,. . -. ,. .
- . ,. ,. ,. . -,. ,. .
- . ,. ,. ,. . -,. ,. .
- . ,. ,. ,. . -,. ,. .
a Mean of  and .
b Assise Revenues: the total revenues derived from the annual sale of excise-tax farms, for the taxes levied on the consumption of wine, beer,
grain, bread, meat, herring, wool and linen textiles, charcoal, wood, and other such commodities. (Assise = Accijnzen).
S: Algemeen Rijksarchief Brussel, Rekenkamer, registers nos. , () to , ().
